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INTRODUCTION

It has been twenty-seven years since the United States Supreme Court,
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 1 sparked a new framework for analyzing
state and local regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause.2 Since
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1. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
2. The Commerce Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The "dormant" Commerce Clause
is not actually a "clause" at all; it is simply a popular term used to describe the long
held view that the Commerce Clause's affirmative grant of power to Congress to
regulate interstate commerce also places some restrictions on the states' power, when
Congress is silent, to enact local legislation impacting interstate commerce. Thus, courts
may evaluate state and local legislation that impacts interstate commerce under the
dormant Commerce Clause, but Congress has the ultimate power to validate state laws
that a court may otherwise declare invalid. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). In this context, the term "dormant" is actually a misnomer.
See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
n.l (1982) ("It is clear that what remains dormant is Congress, and not the commerce
clause. The clause's limitation on state regulation can certainly be termed implicit,
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that time, the evolution of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has been sometimes inconsistent and often controversial. 3
In recent years, the dormant Commerce Clause has been the subject of
a number of Supreme Court cases.4 In the 1993-94 term alone, the
Court issued three key opinions in which the sole or primary issue
involved state or local regulations5 that were challenged as discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce. 6 In each case, the

silent, or negative, but dormancy does not accurately describe the situation."). I adopt
the term "dormant Commerce Clause" in this article because it is a widely recognized
term of art that instantly describes the negative consequences that flow to the States from
the Commerce Clause. See id.
3. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590,
1628 (1997) (Thomas J., dissenting) (arguing that dormant commerce clause precedent
is so "unworkable" that it should "not [be] entitled to the weight of stare decisis");
American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201-03 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining disagreement with the entirety of the Court's negative Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and noting that "no body of our decisional law has changed as regularly
as our 'negative' commerce clause jurisprudence."); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. Of
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the "standard practice"
of balancing burdens against benefits in dormant Commerce Clause analysis is "ill suited
to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all."). The Supreme Court
has appropriately recognized that its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is a
"quagmire." See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
458 (1959)(quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954)). Accord,
Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d I, 9 (1st Cir. 1992) ("The
precedents determining when a state law or regulation violates the dormant commerce
clause doctrine are peculiarly murky.").
4. Although the Pike case was itself dormant for its first five years, the dormant
Commerce Clause enjoyed a revival of sorts in the early 1980s. See Eule, supra note
2, at 425-26 (noting ten Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause opinions from 1975
through 1981 and collecting cases). The Court has issued eight dormant Commerce
Clause cases since 1992. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 117 S. Ct. at 159; Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S.Ct. 811 (1997); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512
U.S. 186 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Oregon
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality., 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502
U.S. 437 (1992). In seven of the eight cases, the Court held that the challenged state
or local legislation was invalid under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
5. The dormant Commerce Clause applies not only to measures adopted by a state
that discriminate against or burden interstate commerce, but also to measures adopted
by a political subdivision of a state. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361.
6. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. 186, 188; C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at
385; Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 95. In addition, the Court has recently decided
several cases involving dormant Commerce Clause limitations on state taxation and one
case applying a dormant Commerce Clause analysis to test the reasonableness of an
airport's user fees under the federal Anti-Head Tax Act. See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v.
Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848 (1996) (North Carolina's intangibles tax impermissibly
discriminates against interstate commerce); Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512
U.S. 298 (1994) (California's method of determining a corporate franchise tax does not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause); Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641
(1994) (Missouri's use tax impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce);
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Court struck down the local regulations as a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause. 7 Although the Court's rulings in these recent
dormant Commerce Clause cases suggest a strike against state power in
the federalism balance, the Court has simultaneously demonstrated its
willingness to limit the seemingly infinite scope of Congressional power
granted under the Commerce Clause. 8 A reconsideration or clarification
of the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause could play a key role in
the Court's developing federalism ideology. 9
Although Pike v. Bruce Church is most frequently cited for defining
and embracing a balancing test in dormant Commerce Clause review, 10
this article will show that Pike is also responsible for the emergence of
a discrimination-focused analysis. The contemporary dormant Commerce Clause inquiry typically develops along two lines: 11 first, the
court asks whether the ordinance in question "discriminates" against

Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent, Mich., 510 U.S. 355 (1994) (airport's user fees
are reasonable under the federal Anti-Head Tax Act and do not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause). This Article is concerned only with the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis of state regulatory measures and not the separate area of limitations on state
taxation measures. Similarly, this Article does not consider the efficacy of the "marketparticipant" exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. '
7. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194; C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 383;
Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 93. The recent influx of dormant Commerce Clause
cases appears to be steady. In the 1996-97 term, the Court decided two dormant
Commerce Clause cases: Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S.
Ct. at 1600-01 (holding that Maine's property tax exemption statute violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because it excluded organizations operated principally for the benefit
ofnonresidents), and Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. at 811 (holding that Ohio's
differential treatment of natural gas distributors did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause because independent marketers (the entities burdened) and public utilities (the
entities benefited) serve different markets).
8. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause).
9. See Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WISC. L.
REV. 125, 130 (1979) (dormant Commerce Clause cases "provide a useful ground for
developing general ideas about federalism.").
10. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J. concurring) (Pike v. Bruce Church first adopted the "balancing" approach to
dormant Commerce Clause cases); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. Of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("[I]t has become standard practice at least
since Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. [citation omitted] to consider ... whether the burden
on commerce imposed by a state statute 'is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits . . . ."').
11. See irifra note 194 (collecting cases to demonstrate the evolution of a "twotiered" approach to dormant Commerce Clause review).

573

interstate commerce. If the answer is yes, the court will apply the
strictest scrutiny to the ordinance under a near-fatal rule of "virtual per
se" invalidity. 12 If the answer to the discrimination inquiry is no, the
court proceeds to "balance" the ordinance's "incidental" burdens on
interstate commerce against it's "putative local benefits." 13 Under this
relaxed balancing standard, the ordinance will be declared valid if the
court determines that the incidental burdens are not "clearly excessive"
in relation to the putative benefits. 14
Thus, a court's threshold determination on the question of interstate
discrimination dictates the standard under which the court will review
the local regulation. It is essentially an outcome-determinative finding.
As the standard's name suggests, a discriminatory regulation will almost
never survive review under the virtual per se invalid standard of
scrutiny. 15 A regulation analyzed under the Pike balancing test, on the
other hand, has a far better chance of being declared valid. 16 Naturally,

12. There is understandably some confusion over the meaning of the oxymoronic
phrase "virtual per se" invalidity. At times, the Supreme Court and lower courts,
presumably relying on the "per se" language of the standard, invalidated a discriminatory
statute without further analysis. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 99-100 (1984) (refusing to uphold Alaska's timber restrictions under virtual per
se standard without analysis of State's purpose or existing alternatives); Waste Sys. Corp.
v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993) (striking down discriminatory
regulation under the per se invalid standard without further analysis); cf. Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, 117 S. Ct. at 1601 (noting that facial discrimination by itself may
be a "fatal defect," refusing to fully consider whether the statute should survive the per
se standard where the proponent failed to argue within that standard, and suggesting that
the proponent of the state's tax exemption statute may have realized the ''weight of its
burden" when it chose to make no effort to defend the statute under the per se rule).
Typically, however, the Court will allow the state a final opportunity to save the statute
by showing that no reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives exist to serve the statute's
legitimate local purpose. See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 383; Oregon Waste Sys., 511
U.S. at 93. This last-ditch opportunity is largely illusory. With only one exception, the
Court has not upheld a statute it determined to be discriminatory and thus subject to the
per se invalid standard. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148-49 n.19 (1986) ("Even
overt discrimination against interstate trade may be justified where, as in this case, outof-state goods or services are particularly likely . . . to threaten the health and safety of
a state's citizens or the integrity of its natural resources.").
13. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). This is the portion of
the analysis frequently referred to as "balancing." See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981).
14. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
15. See Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101 (justification for discriminatory
legislation must pass the "strictest scrutiny" and "facial discrimination by itself may be
a fatal defect."). See also Scariano v. Justices of the Supreme Court oflndiana, 38 F.3d
920,926 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Application of the second 'test' [referring to the per se invalid
test] almost invariably results in a state statute's invalidation.") (citing Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1985)).
16. See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 375 (1983) (upholding under balancing test Arkansas Public Service Commission's
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attorneys litigating dormant Commerce Clause cases concentrate their
efforts on persuading the court that the regulation in question either does
or does not "discriminate" against interstate commerce.17 This article
suggests that in the process of focusing narrowly on the interstate
discrimination inquiry, courts and litigants have lost sight of the reason
why we ask the question. 18
This article argues that the primary concern in evaluating local
regulations ought to be the long-recognized prohibition against resident
economic protectionism. As such, a court should analyze local
regulations for discriminatory impact only after first determining that the
regulation is not protectionist. In general, courts are so concerned with
the discrimination inquiry that they typically do no more than pay lip
service to notions of economic protectionism, usually blurring the two
principles or recognizing the protectionism concern merely by reciting
a few perfunctory sentences as a statement of general principle. In this
article, I will demonstrate that economic protectionism and interstate
discrimination are not synonyms and should not be treated as such. The
two principles ask different questions and demand a different focus. My
thesis is premised on the notion that the Court will arrive at correct
results in complex dormant Commerce Clause cases more consistently,
predictably, and easily if it asks the correct question. 19 Moreover, as
the Court becomes more committed to the discrimination model of

rate structure); Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 456 (upholding under balancing
test a Minnesota statute banning sale of milk in plastic containers, but permitting such
sale in paperboard containers).
17. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 1996 WL 245552 (No. 94-1988); Brief for Petitioner, West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (No. 93-141); Brief for Petitioner, C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (No. 92-1402); Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid
Waste Crisis: Flow Control And The Commerce Clause, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 529, 563
(1994) (noting that "[t]he parties in Carbone have framed their arguments to the Supreme
Court almost exclusively as a question whether the strict scrutiny test or the Pike
balancing test is the proper analytic framework ....").
18. Much commentary on the dormant Commerce Clause has focused on the merits
of the "balancing" test. For an exploration and critique of the balancing approach, see
Earl M. Maltz, Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47 (1981). This article takes a different focus,
evaluating instead the interstate discrimination analysis that often forestalls any attempt
at balancing.
19. See, e.g., William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional
State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 388 (1983)
("[A]sking the right question is often the first step to the right solution.").
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dormant Commerce Clause review, it increasingly struggles to find
interstate discrimination in cases with facts that do not fit the paradigm. 20
Section One of this article offers working definitions and elements of
both discrimination against interstate commerce and economic protectionism. It then illustrates the analytical differences between economic
protectionism and discrimination, focusing primarily on the Court's
recent analysis of local environmental flow control legislation under the
dormant Commerce Clause in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown.
Section Two briefly outlines the development of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and the evolution of the current two-tiered
"discrimination model" of dormant Commerce Clause review.
Finally section Three of this Article suggests why it is important to
adopt a dormant Commerce Clause test that focuses on targeting
economic protectionism as the evil meant to be addressed by the
dormant Commerce Clause. Section Three concludes that a dormant
Commerce Clause test should review local regulations first for economic
protectionism and next for discrimination, but it should not subject every
state law to review under the dormant Commerce Clause. A rule of per
se invalidity, or even "virtual" per se invalidity, is not appropriate for all
"discriminatory" regulations; rather, it should govern only those
regulations that are economic protectionist measures. If a regulation,
however, does not discriminate against interstate commerce and it is not
an exercise in economic protectionism, the mere fact that the wisdom of
the regulation may be questionable should not subject it to a constitutionality review under the dormant Commerce Clause. 21

20. Other commentators have concluded that the primary purpose behind the
dormant Commerce Clause is the prevention of state economic protectionism or the
promotion of harmony among the states. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Economic Union
as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U.L. REV. 43, 46 (1988) (arguing dormant Commerce
Clause's purpose is preventing interstate conflict, not protecting individual rights);
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1206-07 (1986) (arguing that
despite a plea from scholars to "balance" in dormant Commerce Clause cases, the Court
has been concerned and should continue to be concerned only with preventing purposeful
protectionism). Unlike these articles, which accept the discrimination inquiry as an
appropriate proxy for protectionism, see infra note 59, this Article demonstrates the
limitations of the discrimination test and argues that the Court should specifically
distinguish between economic protectionism and discrimination. It then suggests a model
of dormant Commerce Clause review that incorporates but subordinates the Court's
current focus on discrimination.
21. Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), courts and commentators have debated whether, at its very core, the Commerce Clause's affirmative grant of
power to Congress should be interpreted as an implicit grant of power to the judiciary
to oversee state action that affects interstate commerce when Congress is silent. See,
e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TAINEY AND
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SECTION ONE

I.

ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION-DISTINGUISHING ECONOMIC
PROTECTIONISM FROM DISCRIMINATION

The discrimination test for impermissible state and local regulations
is at once too broad and too narrow. It catches in its net a host of
nonprotectionist regulations that "discriminate" against interstate
commerce, but that do not deserve strict judicial review under the
virtually per se standard of invalidity. Yet, the discrimination test misses
certain protectionist measures that do warrant strict judicial review but
that cannot be said to "discriminate" under any sensible understanding
of discrimination against interstate commerce.

WAITE (1937). In the Supreme Court, the debate over the validity of a "dormant"
Commerce Clause attained an "equilibrium" in Chief Justice Waite's period on the
Court. Id. at 7. Thereafter, the Court's Commerce Clause decisions were rarely
concerned with the affirmative power granted to Congress to enact federal legislation and
dealt almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on State legislation. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 634-42 (1995) (discussing the history of the
Court's Commerce Clause decisions); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,
193 (1994) (citing 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 478 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (noting that "[t]he 'negative' aspect of the commerce clause was considered
the more important by the 'father of the Constitution,' James Madison.")). Notwithstanding its long history, some commentators and, most recently, a United States
Supreme Court justice, have called for the abolition of the dormant Commerce Clause.
See Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of its Misery, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1991); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569;
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1614-28 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the entire dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
should be abandoned and replaced with a restored Import-Export Clause check on
discriminatory state taxation); cf Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 831
(1997) (Scalia, J. concurring) (reiterating his view that he will "enforce on stare decisis
grounds a 'negative' self-executing Commerce Clause in two situations: (1) against a
state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state
law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this
Court."). This Article begins with the premise that the dormant Commerce Clause,
accepted by courts for over a century, is now long-settled doctrine, with value and, if
properly focused, practical workability. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at
549 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the "widespread acceptance" of the Court's
"authority to enforce the dormant commerce clause."); see also Collins, supra note 20,
at 45, 58 (arguing that the value of continuity in law demands a careful and extensive
justification before abolishing a doctrine like the dormant Commerce Clause power,
which has been applied for more than a century).
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This section begins by offering an intuitive, general understanding of
discrimination and protectionism, briefly exploring some hypothetical
state statutes to outline the distinction between these two principles. It
then offers working definitions of discrimination against interstate
commerce and economic protectionism and explores in detail the
components of these principles. Finally, this section demonstrates the
distinctions between discrimination and protectionism by analyzing the
Court's recent decision in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown,22 and its
decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.23

A.

Setting up the Distinction Between
Discrimination and Protectionism

The Court has defined discrimination against interstate commerce as
the "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and burdens the latter. " 24 It is a broad concept
that does not suggest invidiousness; it "simply means differential
treatment. " 25 In general, a state statute can discriminate against
interstate commerce on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect. 26
A state statute that facially discriminates against interstate commerce
is usually easy to identify. 27 Imagine, for example, that an Arizona
state statute provides that all Arizona bakeries must use only locallygrown Arizona fruit in their pies, cookies, and other baked goods. 28 It

22. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
23. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
24. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 98, 99 (1994).
25. Id.
26. See Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74
CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1239 (1986). Of course, discrimination is a familiar concept in
other areas of modem constitutional analysis, something Professor Collins draws on to
conclude that the dormant Commerce Clause analysis has become muddled with personal
rights theories. See Collins, supra note 20, at 45. In the equal protection area, for
example, discrimination is typically categorized as either "de jure" (purposeful)
discrimination or "de facto" (effectual) discrimination. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER,
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 375 (5th ed. 1992). The Court has held
that legislative purpose or intent to discriminate, which is the differentiating factor
between the two classifications, is a necessary requirement for demonstrating an equal
protection violation. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
27. But see infra note 170 (discussing argument that the mandatory in-state
requirement in Pike was not facially discriminatory). The recent case of Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison illustrates the difficulties of engaging in a
discrimination analysis even when a statute plainly discriminates on its face. See infra
notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
28. State statutes mandating the use of local products or services are commonly
presented in dormant Commerce Clause challenges. See, e.g., Pike, 397 U.S. 137, 145
(1970) (citing cases where state statutes required that business operations be performed
in the enacting state). Such statutes continue to present themselves today in various
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is not difficult to conclude that this statute "discriminates" against
interstate commerce on its face. It expressly isolates Arizona produce
as the only produce that Arizona bakers can use in their baked goods.
Thus, even if California offered fresh fruit that was superior in both
quality and price, the statute would prohibit an Arizona baker from using
the California fruit. This hypothetical statute discriminates on its face
because it expressly calls for. the "differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state economic interests," to the benefit of resident interests (instate produce farmers and wholesalers) and to the detriment of nonresident interests (out-of-state produce farmers and wholesalers).
Now consider a slightly different form of a facially discriminatory
statute. Imagine that an Arizona state statute provides that only fresh
produce grown in the state may be advertised and promoted in Arizona's
print or television advertising. 29 Unlike the previous hypothetical, this
statute does not expressly prohibit Arizona bakers from using out-of-state
fresh produce; however, it does prohibit Arizona retailers from
advertising or promoting out-of-state produce beyond point-of-purchase
advertising in the stores or markets. This statute discriminates facially
because it expressly distinguishes Arizona produce from produce grown
outside the state borders, and grants a benefit, the right to promote and
advertise, only to produce grown on the Arizona side of the line, a line
expressly drawn by the terms of the statute itself. It simultaneously
imposes a burden, the prohibition against such promotion and advertising, on produce grown on the other side of the line, placing out-of-state
produce at a disadvantage in the retail market.
It is not difficult to conclude that statutes facially preferring the
products of the enacting state are exercises in state protectionism as well
as discrimination. 30 A common understanding of protectionism is the

forms. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (mandating that
Oklahoma utilities use a blend containing at least 10% Oklahoma coal) (discussed infra
note 98 and accompanying text).
29. Ignore the First Amendment implications that this state statute presents. See
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (State statute prohibiting
advertisement of liquor prices violates the First Amendment).
30. See Russell Korobkin, The Local Politics ofAcid Rain: Public Versus Private
Decisionmaking and the Dormant Commerce Clause in a New Era of Environmental
Law, 75 B.U. L. REV. 689, 741 (1995) (noting that it is not always clear when a statute
unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce, but that "it is clear that
laws that facially prefer products of the enacting state to other products fall on the
unconstitutional side of the line."); Regan, supra note 20, at 1134-35 (explicit
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act of guarding or shielding one's own. 31 A general understanding of
a protectionist measure invokes an image of a tariff, embargo, or
quota. 32 The intentional, self-serving nature of a typical protectionist
measure is likely to invoke anxiety in other states and invite hostile,
retaliatory m.easures. 33 In evaluating a state statute for protectionism.,
the focus ought to be on whether the state enacted the statute because it
intended to isolate itself and/or protect a segment of its industry from.
com.petition on the interstate market.
Like m.ost regulations that explicitly discriminate on their face, the two
hypothetical Arizona produce statutes are also protectionist measures.
In both examples, the state is granting economic protection to a segment
of its industry, Arizona produce farmers and wholesalers, and attempting
to secure for them., through its isolating and protective legislation, a
larger share of the interstate market. Although one can imagine an
ostensible health rationale to justify the statutes,34 the statutes are
classic examples of a state isolating a local industry from. interstate
com.petition by legislatively securing for the industry a steady stream. of
customers or a larger market share. If even a hint existed in the record
that Arizona's produce farmers were going out of business, or losing
market share in the interstate market, or even that they could be
expected to lose market share in the future, any legitimate rationale for
such explicitly isolating and self-serving measures loses all credibility.
Thus, such statutes generally present the easy case in dorm.ant Com.m.erce

discrimination along state lines should always trigger virtual per se invalid rule).
31. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 946 (1988)
(defining the verb "protect" as "to cover or shield from exposure, injury, or destruction"
and the noun "protectionist" as "an advocate of government economic protection for
domestic producers through restrictions on foreign competitors."); Collins, supra note 20,
at 74 ("Classic protectionism meant shielding domestic producers against competition
from imports.").
32. See Regan, supra note 20, at 1112 ("We all have an intuitive idea of the core
behavior we think of as protectionist. It is the imposition of tariffs, embargoes, quotas,
and the like, for the purpose of protecting local producers (farmers, manufacturers,
laborers) against foreign competition."). An embargo is a "governmentally imposed
quantitative restriction-of zero-on the importation of merchandise." K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, 485 U.S. 176, 185 (1988). A protective tariff is a duty imposed on imports that
is intended primarily to protect local producers by securing for them a larger share of
the local market for their goods. See Regan, supra note 20, at 1094; West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994); Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Md., 347
U.S. 340, 343 (1954) (comparing use tax to a protective tariff).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 56-119 for an analysis of the key
components of protectionism.
34. The state of Arizona might assert, for example, that it is simply attempting to
promote the health of its citizens by encouraging them to purchase and consume produce
that is grown closer to home and is thus likely to be fresher than produce grown out-ofstate.
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Clause review--they are appropriately invalidated under either a
discrimination model or a protectionism model of dormant Commerce
Clause review.
Now, briefly consider a tougher case. Imagine an Arizona statute that
prohibited all produce retailers from advertising the price of all their
fresh fruits and vegetables. The state might assert, as a reasonable
health rationale behind such a regulation, that it is attempting to promote
a commercial focus on produce freshness instead of produce price. On
its face, this statute does not "discriminate" against interstate commerce.
All retailers are prevented from advertising any produce prices; in-state
and out-of-state interests are treated exactly the same. Yet, an analysis
of the effects of the statute may reveal that the statute's de-emphasis on
price is likely to favor the state's smaller farmers and "mom and pop"
produce retailers, while simultaneously placing the larger, more pricecompetitive interstate produce retailers at a disadvantage. Such a statute
would then discriminate in its effect. Facially neutral statutes that may
in some way "discriminate" in their effect present a fundamental
perplexity in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Under the
Court's current discrimination-focused model for dormant Commerce
Clause review, once a statute is determined to discriminate in its
"effect," arguably even slightly, it might be subject to the strictest
judicial scrutiny and near certain invalidity under the per se invalid
standard of review. 35 This Article suggests that only by focusing on

35. The Court has plainly stated that neutral statutes that discriminate in effect
must be struck down under the strict per se invalid standard of review. See BrownForman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1985) ("When
a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when
its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have
generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.") (emphasis added). Although
lower courts' dormant Commerce Clause review is in a general state of disarray, see
infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text, some lower courts appear to have accepted
the view that even a facially neutral statute that does not purposefully discriminate
against interstate commerce must nevertheless be scrutinized under the strict per se
invalid standard if the statute discriminates against interstate commerce "in effect." See,
e.g., Government Suppliers Consolidating Serv., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th
Cir. 1992) (a determination that a statute is facially neutral and "purports to regulate
evenhandedly does not end the question of which level of scrutiny should apply"; a court
must also look to the practical effect of the statute to see if it warrants invalidation under
the per se invalid standard). But see Hispanic Taco Vendors v. City of Pasco, 994 F.2d
676, 679 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no facial discrimination, the court applied the
balancing test); Alaska Airlines, Inc., v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 984 (9th Cir.
1991) (if a statute does not discriminate on its face and the state's goals are not illusory,
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protectionism, instead of discrimination, and reviewing the state's
purpose in enacting the statute can a reviewing court accurately
determine whether a state statute warrants strict judicial review or
whether it deserves judicial deference.

B.

Working Definitions and Components of Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce and Economic Protectionism
1.

Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce

As previously noted, the most commonly cited definition of discrimination against interstate commerce is the "differential treatment of instate and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter."36 Overall, the discrimination principle is widely
viewed as giving effect to process-oriented concems. 37 The political
process rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause rests on the
assumption that courts are competent to eliminate, and more likely to be
concerned with, state legislation that favors local residents who are
represented in the local political process while burdening non-residents
who are unrepresented or underrepresented in the local process. 38 In
determining whether a statute discriminates against interstate commerce,
for example, the Court has occasionally focused on the local democratic
process, typically asking whether the burdens of the law are imposed
substantially on "outsiders" who have little voice in the policy decisions
of the state, making them likely targets for unfavorable treatment. 39
This test for discrimination against interstate commerce, sometimes

insignificant, or protectionist, the statute should be upheld under lenient review standard).
36. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
37. See Eule, supra note 2, at 428 (advocating a process-based structure for the
dormant Commerce Clause that ensures protection of the democratic process); Tushnet,
supra note 9, at 141 (suggesting categories of discriminatory impact based on where the
benefits and burdens of legislation falls and advocating different standards for different
categories to respect the impact of the political restraints that are in place when
legislation affects in-state interests).
38. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 133-40 (arguing that the Court is more likely to
intervene if unfairness exists in the political process); Korobkin, supra note 30, at 748-49
(arguing that courts have the institutional ability to protect the interests of unrepresented
or underrepresented groups).
39. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994) (majority
relies on political process argument to support conclusion that statute violates the
dormant Commerce Clause, while Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, calls for a rethinking of
the political process doctrine); Dep't of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 3512 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (using process policy to give meaning to the statutory
term "discrimination").
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known as the "inner political check doctrine,''4° provides that a court
will look upon a statute with more favor if some portion of the statute's
burdens are borne by those with a voice in the system, who can serve as
a check on local legislative process.41
The key component to the notion of "discrimination" rests on a
comparison of in-state or in-region benefits and burdens with out-of-state
or out-of-region benefits and burdens.42 If a court fails to compare instate and out-of-state benefits and burdens, it can, at best, evaluate an
ordinance's impact on interstate commerce. It cannot judge "discrimination" against interstate commerce without engaging in the comparison
process. After all, "discrimination" against interstate commerce does not
mean "burden,'' "impact,'' or "effect" on interstate commerce.43 If an
ordinance burdens interstate and intrastate commerce equally, it cannot
be said to discriminate against interstate commerce. Thus, to test
properly for discrimination, a court must draw a line around a region,
enabling it to evaluate whether local businesses enjoy a competitive
advantage under the ordinance vis-a-vis their non-local competitors.44
Arguably, a significant contribution to the confusion surrounding the
discrimination model of dormant Commerce Clause review has been "the
Court's failure to identify unambiguously who or what it is that state
40. Ronald Rotunda, The Doctrine of the Inner Political Check, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and Federal Preemption, 53 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 263, 265 (1986).
41. See West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 214; Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,
266 (1989); Winkfield S. Twyman, Jr., Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination
in Interstate Commerce, 46 S.C.L. REV. 381, 388-90 (1995); Christopher D. Marchese,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and Airport Noise: A Case for Narrow Judicial Review,

44 BAYLOR L. REV. 645, 669-70 (1992).
42. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) ("A
discrimination claim, by its nature, requires a comparison of the two classifications...");
see also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 131-40 (suggesting categories of discriminatory impact
based on where the benefits and burdens of a statute fall).
43. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 30, at 740 (defining doctrinal analysis as
determining whether a statute "discriminates" against interstate commerce or merely
"incidentally burdens" it).
44. See, e.g., C & A Carbone,. Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 403 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that all the decisions relied on by the majority
discriminate on the basis of geographic origin). In a recent case, for example, the Court
refused to find that an airport user fee discriminated against interstate travel in favor of
"general aviation" because the ordinance's challengers had failed to establish that the
"general aviation" population typically traveled intrastate. See Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. County of Kent, Mich., 510 U.S. 355, 372-73 (1994). In other words, the Court
required a proper record to make a comparison between interstate interests and intrastate
interests before it would engage in a discrimination analysis.
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legislatures may not discriminate against.'"' 5 At times, the Court has
looked to the item of commerce and asked whether a State was discriminating against it because it originated out-of-state. 46 More commonly,
however, the Court will compare the "economic interests" of the players
in commerce-the individual or corporate producers, wholesalers, and
retailers-to determine whether a State is subjecting out-of-state players
to discriminatory, differential treatment. 47 Practically speaking, it
appears that the Court will always focus on people, perhaps because it
is nearly impossible to evaluate discrimination against an article of
commerce without considering the economic interests of the actors who
participated in the article's manufacture, distribution, sale, and consumption.48
Comparing the impact of a state statute on the players in interstate
commerce raises the question of whether courts must evaluate and
compare identical, or at least similar, interests. Of course, courts are not
unfamiliar with testing a myriad of rules, regulations, and policies for
"discrimination" in other areas of law, and typically, the discrimination
comparison process requires a comparison of similarly situated

45. Buie, supra note 2, at 444.
46. See id. at 485 n.4 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27
(deciding that New Jersey could not discriminate "against articles of commerce coming
from outside the State.")); cf Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) (relying primarily on conclusion that
Michigan could not explain "why solid waste coming from outside the county should be
treated differently from solid waste within the county..." but also noting that the statute
affords local producers "complete protection from competition" posed by nonlocal
producers).
47. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391 ("the article of commerce is not so
much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing and disposing of it.");
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 196 (1994) (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)) (finding law unconstitutional because it
neutralized advantages enjoyed by lower cost out-of-state producers); Buie, supra note
2, at 467 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977)) (finding that North Carolina's statute was discriminatory because it increased the
cost of doing business for Washington apple growers).
48. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep't of Bnvtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 95
(1994) (finding that Oregon surcharge discriminates against waste from other states by
comparing the economic interests of Oregon waste shippers with their counterparts who
handle waste generated in other states); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361; Bacchus Imports,
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 269 (1984) (looking to liquor market as a whole, not just
specific liquors, to determine that local okolehao and pineapple wine may pose a
"competitive threat to other liquors produced elsewhere and consumed in Hawaii.").
Recently, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Justice Scalia sought to compare narrowly the
properties that may or may not have been entitled to a tax exemption to support his
argument that no discrimination existed because the properties were not similarly
situated. 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1609-14 (1997).
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interests.49 Recently, the United States Supreme Court expressly
recognized that in any discrimination analysis, including one made under
the dormant Commerce Clause, it is a "central assumption" that a court
must compare "substantially similar entities."50 In Tracy, the Court
reasoned that if two entities served different markets and would continue
to do so even after a discriminatory burden placed on one of the entities
was removed, eliminating the differential "would not serve the dormant
Commerce Clause's fundamental objective of preserving a national
market for competition undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred
by a State upon its residents or resident competitors."51 The notion of
comparing only direct competitors to determine invalidity under the
dormant Commerce Clause has long had its proponents,52 and litigants
and lower courts have occasionally advanced complicated arguments that
discrimination does not exist unless a statute directly betters the position
of a local actor in interstate commerce when compared with a non-local
direct competitor. 53

49. In testing for discrimination under a Title VII disparate treatment case, for
example, a court will look for evidence of disparity in the treatment of "similarly
situated" coworkers. See, e.g., Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1134 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("An individual suffers 'disparate treatment' [under Title VII] when he or she
is 'singled out and treated less favorably than others similarly situated.... "'). A
common-sense understanding of discrimination, for example, is the act of treating people
in similar circumstances differently. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 362 (1988) (defining the verb "discriminate" as distinguishing from another
"like object").
50. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824 (1997).
51. Id. at 824. Cf Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 117 S. Ct. at 1602 n.16
(acknowledging the Tracy opinion and noting that "it may be true that 'disparate
treatment constitutes discrimination only if the objects of the disparate treatment are ...
similarly situated"'). The Court's reasoning in Tracy was sensible precisely because the
parallel entities that were benefited and burdened by the regulation arguably served
entirely different markets; however, complexities result if Tracy is extended to require
only parallel comparisons between direct competitors in the same market. See infra note
53 (example of such an argument made in the West Lynn Creamery case).
52. See Collins, supra note 20, at 75 (noting that the antidiscrimination rule
"largely corresponds" with protectionism and covers "only laws that favor local interests
over their direct external competitors"); Regan, supra note 20, at 1095-96 (using
discrimination to define invalid protectionist legislation as that which improves, by
purpose or effect, "the competitive position of local actors vis-a-vis foreign competitors,"
and specifically noting that courts must compare producers to producers, workers to
workers, distributors to distributors, and consumers to consumers). But see infra note
76 (discussing Regan's anti-protectionism and no-singling out principles).
53. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 202 (1994)
(supporters of Massachusetts's milk pricing order argue that the pricing order is not
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Another element of the anti-discrimination principle is the notion that
the "degree" of discrimination is theoretically irrelevant to the fact of
discrimination. 54 This seems sensible. Testing a statute for the extent
it affects interstate commerce is analytically distinct from asking whether
the statute in fact discriminates against interstate commerce. Thus, the
Court has consistently held that "discrimination" is the impermissible
evil prohibited by the per se rules of the dormant Commerce Clause, and
the magnitude, degree, or scope of the discrimination has "no bearing on
the determinative question of whether discrimination has occurred."55
Thus, to summarize, a regulation "discriminates" against interstate
commerce if it places economic burdens outside a state or geographic
region to the economic benefit of those inside the state or region.
Testing for discrimination requires a comparison of benefits, burdens,
and economic interests. Arguably, the court should compare the interests
of direct competitors. At the very least, the interests must be sufficiently

discriminatory because milk dealers, the parties required by the pricing order to pay
premiums on milk, and milk farmers, the recipients of the rebate, are not direct
competitors). Others have offered definitions of discrimination that compare general
economic burdens and benefits without requiring specific comparisons of similarly
situated competitors. See Smith, supra note 26, at 1213 (defining a regulation as
discriminatory if it "imposes greater economic burdens on those outside the state to the
economic advantage of those within.").
54. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,455 (1992) ("The volume of commerce
affected measures only the extent of discrimination; it is of no relevance to the
determination whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce.");
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981) (Although further hearings might
"provide a precise determination of the extent of discrimination ... [w]e need not know
how unequal [a] [t]ax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates.")
(emphasis added). Cf. Rowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1972)
(degree of discrimination practiced by an employer is "unimportant" in a Title VII
discrimination claim).
55. Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641,650 (1994); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 117 S. Ct. at 1601 n.15 (noting that "there is no 'de minimis' defense
to a charge of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce Clause."); Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 363
(1994); Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455 (only relevant to inquire whether discrimination exists
or not; courts should not care about the volume of commerce affected or the extent of
discrimination); New Energy Co. oflnd. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276-77 (1988). But
see Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (evaluating the extent of
the burden on interstate commerce, deciding it was minimal, and thus concluding that
no discrimination existed); Smith, supra note at 26, at 1213 (evaluating as part of the
discrimination analysis which kinds of economic burdens are "sufficient" enough to
constitute discrimination). In application, the Court has contributed to the confusion
regarding the meaning of discrimination by employing ambiguous modifiers to define
discrimination, suggesting that the magnitude of the discrimination matters. See Fort
Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 359-60, 366-67 (1992) (Michigan law invalidated because it
"clearly" and "unambiguously" discriminated against interstate commerce); New Energy
Co., 486 U.S. at 274-80 (Court employs strictest scrutiny to Indiana's reciprocity statute
because the statute's discrimination was "clear," "patent," and "plain").
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similar to make the comparisons sensible. Moreover, the discrimination
test requires a determination of who has a voice in the local democratic
process to ensure that political checks exist on the local legislature.
Finally, under the discrimination model, it should not matter how much
a regulation discriminates; the degree of discrimination is irrelevant to
the determination of whether a regulation does, in fact, discriminate.

2.

Economic Protectionism

Courts and commentators have offered various definitions of economic
protectionism; however, few definitions strike a distinction between
economic protectionism and discrimination. For example, a popular
definition with the court of a "protectionist" regulation is one "designed
to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."56 Another widely accepted definition of per se invalid protectionism is a regulation that, in effect, "favor[s] in-state economic interests
over out-of-state interests."57 These tests require a comparison of a
statute's benefits and burdens on resident and non-resident economic
interests. They sound like discrimination against interstate commerce,
and it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to discern any distinction
among these general definitions. 58 Similarly, even commentators
arguing that the primary goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is

56. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 192; Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 454; New Energy
Co., 486 U.S. at 273-74.
57. Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 522
(1989) (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
58. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (defining discrimination). See also
infra notes 200-01 (illustrating how notions of economic protectionism and discrimination have blurred together). The Court has occasionally hinted at the distinction between
protectionism and discrimination by defining a protectionist statute as one that preserves
local industry by ''protecting it from the rigors of interstate competition" or by
"neutraliz[ing] advantages" enjoyed by others. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194.
But see id. at 20858. (Scalia, J., concurring) (neutralizing advantages should not be a
factor for the Court's consideration in dormant Commerce Clause review). Similarly,
the Court has defined a protectionist measure as one that imposes an "economic barrier"
against competition. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935); see also
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("The clearest example of
[protectionist] legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at
a State's borders."). These definitions at least reach beyond the minutia of comparing
specific in-state benefits to out-of-state burdens and focus more on the shielding nature
of protectionism.

587

preventing state protectionism and promoting national unity have
accepted the discrimination analysis as an adequate proxy for protectionism.59
At this point, I will offer a working definition of "economic protectionism," and then move on to explore the key components that
distinguish protectionism from discrimination. For our purposes, a per
se invalid protectionist state statute will be defined as one that uses,
manipulates, or substantially affects the channels of interstate commerce
purposefully to isolate the state from the national economy or protect
resident economic interests from the national market. It is a statute that
purposefully makes use of the State's own borders or the network of the
interstate market to improve the position of local residents and actors
simply because they are local. Moreover, the working definition offered
here encompasses state protective action that expressly seeks to isolate
the state from the national economy.60 Such explicit protectionism is
a state practice that is so isolating and self-serving, it will likely create
anxious reactions from other States and might even be viewed by
another State as purposefully directed against it. 61 Underlying this
definition of economic protectionism is the view that the primary policy
value advanced by the dormant Commerce Clause is to secure national
unity and harmony in a national free trade market.62

59. See Collins, supra note 20, at 77 ("Discrimination is a reliable indicator of
protectionism because both concepts are defined as treating directly competing local and
out-of-state interests differently."); Regan, supra note 20, at 1099 (defining his antiprotectionism principle as his "own version of the more general idea that states should
not be allowed to discriminate against interstate commerce."). See also infra note 76
(describing in detail Regan's primary anti-protectionism principle). The Court has
occasionally blurred the two concepts by defining an invalid provision as one that is
discriminatory "in the constitutionally prohibited sense-that is a protectionist
enactment." New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278 (1988).
60. Cf Regan, supra note 20, at 1134 ("Explicitness . . . is very strong evidence
for protectionist purpose, both from the point of view of the victim state and from the
point of view of a reviewing court.").
61. See Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 437 (deciding that state could pursue lawsuit against
another state, even after private litigants withdrew from the litigation, because of the
impact of protectionism on the state). See also Regan, supra note 20, at 1112 (analyzing
the unacceptability of protectionism as "practiced by one state against others"). Thus,
protectionism is sometimes noted for its tendency to "excite those jealousies and
retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent." C & A Carbone, Inc.
v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
62. See infra notes 209-29 and accompanying text for discussion of the
justifications underlying the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Jackson provided an
often-quoted description of the free trade market value when he wrote for the Court:
"Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman
shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every
market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no foreign
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them." H.P. Hood & Sons v.

588

[VOL. 34: 571, 1997]

Targeting State Protectionism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Reviewing a statute for economic protectionism differs from a
discrimination-focused review in three fundamental respects: (1) a
protectionism determination does not require a court to engage in the
precise comparisons of similarly situated classifications demanded by a
discrimination review, (2) a review for protectionism focuses directly on
legislative purpose, (3) a review for protectionism permits a reviewing
court to consider the magnitude of a statute's impact on interstate
commerce.

a.

No Benefit/Burden Comparisons Required

The need to compare similarly situated actors primarily distinguishes
discrimination from economic protectionism. While the very nature of
a "discrimination" analysis demands a comparison of a statute's benefits
and burdens among similarly situated residents and non-residents, 63 the
working definition of economic protectionism offered here does not
demand such comparisons. In evaluating a local statute for protectionism, one ought to focus primarily on whether the statute intended to
isolate the state or protect resident interests from the national market,
rather than how benefits and burdens fall after comparing resident and
nonresident competitors.
Avoiding a precise benefit/burden comparison among similarly situated
interests is more than just a question of semantics. Focusing initially on
state isolation or protection efforts will enable a reviewing court to
evaluate more clearly the potential impact of state legislation in a
national union, while avoiding the complexities of a discrimination
analysis. A recent case illustrates the difficulties inherent in any
discrimination comparison. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, the Court
analyzed a Maine tax exemption statute under the dormant Commerce
Clause.64 The Maine statute denied a charitable tax exemption to nonprofit institutions that operated "principally for the benefit of persons
who are not residents of Maine."65 Like most contemporary dormant

DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
63. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
64. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590
(1997).
65. The challenged portion of the Maine statute provides that property tax
exemptions otherwise available to "benevolent and charitable" institutions are to be
denied to any such institution that "is in fact conducted or operated principally for the
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Commerce Clause cases, the parties and the lower courts became mired
in the question of whether the statute "discriminated" against interstate
commerce. The Maine superior court found "direct discrimination" and
analyzed the statute under the strict "per se rule of invalidity." On
appeal, however, the Maine Supreme Court employed a comparison
analysis to determine that the statute did not discriminate against
interstate commerce. In finding no discrimination, the Maine high court
reasoned that the tax exemption statute did not "favor in-state camps
over out-of-state competitors"; rather, it ''treat[ed] all Maine charities
alike," giving them all "the opportunity to qualify for an exemption by
choosing to dispense the majority of their charity locally." Thus, the
Maine Supreme Court found the statute valid under Pikes flexible
balancing standard.66
The Supreme Court similarly focused its review of Maine's statute on
the discrimination inquiry. The five-justice majority held that the statute
violated the dormant Commerce Clause under the strict per se invalid
review standard because it was facially discriminatory, providing tax
exemptions for property owned by charitable institutions only if the
property was used principally for the benefit of Maine residents. 67 The
majority found that "no question" existed that the Maine statute
discriminated on its face because by its express terms, the statute
disparately treated "identically situated Maine nonprofit camps depending
upon whether they favor[ ed] in-state, as opposed to out-of-state,
campers."68 In writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia argued that it is
"not necessarily true" that the Maine statute was facially discriminatory.
Adopting a discrimination analysis unlike the Maine Supreme Court's
analysis, the dissent focused narrowly on the properties in the discrimination comparison and reasoned that a property used primarily for
residents which relieves the State of some of its welfare burden is not
"similarly situated" to a property used principally for the benefit of
nonresidents.69 Thus, Justice Scalia argued that the statute could not
be said to discriminate on its face between similarly situated properties.
The Camps Newfound/Owatonna opinion illustrates the complexity and
the malleability of the discrimination analysis. Apparently, identifying
even express facial discrimination is not as straightforward as one would

benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine." 36 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§ 652 (l)(A)(l} (West 1996).
66. Brief for the Petitioner, Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997) (No. 94-1988).
67. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 117 S. Ct. at 1598-1602.
68. Id. at 1602 n.16.
69. Id. at 1611-14.
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think. In adhering to a pure discrimination analysis, the lower courts
and the Supreme Court became lost in the technical requirements
demanded by the discrimination comparison analysis and failed simply
to recognize the significance of the statute's overall isolating and
protectionist nature. In enacting this statute, the Maine legislature chose
to advance its goal of ensuring that public expenditures benefit residents
of the state rather than non-residents by isolating itself from the national
union and the national market. As the majority appropriately recognized,
the Maine statute is like prior state efforts to protect the environment by
barring or limiting the importation of out-of-state waste,70 and prior
state efforts to isolate natural resources within its borders for the
preferential enjoyment of residents. 71 The explicit barrier against nonresident campers in Maine, expressly targeted against other states'
residents, is likely to invoke hostile reactions and invite retaliatory
measures from other states. The litigants, lower courts, and the majority
and dissent groups on the Supreme Court did not need to become
bogged down in trying to decide if this statute "discriminated" and if so
against what. The Maine statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause,
not because it arguably "discriminated" against out-of-state "products"
or economic interests, but because it was explicitly isolating protectionist
state legislation.
In analyzing legislation for economic protectionism, it is irrelevant
where all the benefits and burdens of statute, those anticipated and those
unforeseen by the legislature, might fall. It is sufficient simply to ask
whether the decisionmakers sought purposefully to protect a segment of
their own and, in doing so, impacted or disrupted the national market.
Moreover, while line-drawing around a geographic region is essential to
a discrimination analysis,72 a line-drawing exercise is wholly unnecessary to the protectionist analysis. Working with a concept of protectionism that is distinct from "line-drawing" more directly accommodates

70. Id. at 1598 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)). See also
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resource, 504 U.S. 353
(1992).
71. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 117 S. Ct. at 1598 (citing New England Power
Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982)).
72. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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circumstances where line-drawing is either impossible73 or non-existent
in protectionist legislation.74
Under the definition of protectionism offered here, a protectionist
statute may well benefit some non-resident economic actors as well as
resident economic actors. Conversely, while offering a protectionist
advantage to one segment, it might spread its burdens primarily among
other local, resident economic actors. Thus, to revisit our first fresh
produce hypothetical, a test for economic protectionism is unconcerned
with the fact that the prohibition against using out-of-state fruit in baked
goods imposes both benefits and burdens on resident economic interests.
Although Arizona produce farmers would be benefited from the
prohibition, Arizona bakers would be burdened because they would be
unable to take advantage of the price and quality competition that existed
on the national market. 75 Similarly, if the Arizona statute results in
granting a benefit to California retail bakers in competition on the
national market with Arizona bakers, a test for protectionism would
nevertheless recognize the underlying intent to aid Arizona farmers and
be unconcerned with the statute's other ramifications. In sum, the
working definition of protectionism does not focus on identifying or
precisely defining the inequality of benefit and burden distribution;
rather, it focuses more narrowly on whether the state purposefully
bestowed a protection on some local economic actors and used or
substantially affected the channels of interstate commerce to grant that
protection. 76

73. See, e.g., infra section IC (discussing the impossibility of finding "discrimination" in flow control cases like C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383
(1994)).
74. In Fireside Nissan, Inc. v. Fanning, 30 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 1994), for example,
a Rhode Island statute offered all existing car dealerships within a twenty mile radius
of a proposed new car dealership a special hearing to protest the new dealership. If such
a law were ultimately determined a protectionist attempt to keep interstate competition
from entering the state, it would not make a difference if the state were so generous that
it extended the benefit of a special hearing wherever the relevant twenty mile radius took
them, even across state lines. Viewing line-drawing as unnecessary allows a court to
recognize that the heart of an impermissible protective benefit can exist locally, even if
some of the benefit is spread across the state's border.
75. Indeed, it is likely that the Arizona bakers would advance the inevitable
dormant Commerce Clause challenge against this regulation, creating an incongruity with
the process based rationale underlying a discrimination-focused review model. See supra
notes 37-41 and accompanying text (describing the inner political check doctrine); infra
notes 212-17 and accompanying text (describing the practical problems with reliance on
the political process rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause).
76. With some key differences, the definition of economic protectionism offered
here borrows from Professor Regan's anti-protectionism and no-singling-out principles.
See generally Regan, supra note 20. Professor Regan defines a statute as "protectionist"
under his anti-protectionism principle if and only if (1) it "was adopted for the purpose
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b.

Protectionist Purpose

A key component of economic protectionism is the existence of a
protectionist legislative motive or purpose. 77 This focus on protectionist purpose is the second key distinction between economic protectionism
and discrimination. A well-intended regulation might easily and
unintentionally "favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state
interests" after the benefits and burdens of the regulation are compared.78 Such a regulation will in fact "discriminate" against interstate
commerce, even if that was not the goal of the local legislature.79

of improving the competitive position of local (in-state) economic actors, just because
they are local, vis-a-vis their foreign ... competitors"; and (2) it is "analogous in form
to the traditional instruments of protectionism- the tariff, the quota, or the outright
embargo." Id. at 1094-95. Professor Regan does not attempt to delineate the broad
reach of an anti-discrimination focus; he instead equates economic protectionism directly
with interstate discrimination. Perhaps because he defines all protectionist legislation as
discriminatory "in the relevant sense," Id. at 1093 n.3, he stresses the importance of
comparing in-state and out-of-state like competitors: producers must be compared with
producers, distributors with distributors, workers with like workers and so on. Id. at
1096. As something of an afterthought, Professor Regan identifies some variations on
this anti-protectionism principle, and defines what he calls the no-singling-out principle.
Id. at 1167-71. Under the broader no-singling-out principle, a state would be prohibited
from "singling-out" for disadvantageous treatment, foreigners in general, not specifically
competitors of similarly situated locals. Id. at 1168. Professor Regan notes that he
prefers the anti-protectionism principle to the no-singling-out principle, but he determines
that either one would be acceptable and the choice "could go either way." Id. at 117274. He recognizes that one might legitimately ask why discrimination against specific
foreign competitors is so specially important. Id. at 1174. The need to resort to a
discrimination model comparison process primarily distinguishes Professor Regan's
definitions of economic protectionism from the working definition offered here.
77. See Regan, supra note 20, at 1095 ("The aspect of my definition of
protectionism that is most to be emphasized is this: for a statute to be protectionist, it
must have a protectionist purpose."). In this discussion, I use the terms purpose and
motive interchangeably. See, e.g., id. at 1143 (noting that "[t]here is no useful
distinction to be made between motive and purpose.").
78. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 653 (1994)
("court need not inquire into the purpose or motivation behind a law to determine that
in actuality it impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce"). The Court has
even gone so far as to denounce purpose as irrelevant in dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (describing legislative
purpose as "not ... relevant to the constitutional issue to be decided."). See also
Oregon Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994) ("The
purpose of, or justification for, a law has no bearing on whether it is facially
discriminatory.").
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A protectionist measure, however, is one that comes complete with
affirmative legislative intent. It is, in essence, a decision to enact
legislation that uses the channels of interstate commerce or affects
interstate commerce because the legislation is expected to protect a
segment of the local population. 80 Thus, while discrimination is broad
and may well be unforeseeable at the time the legislation is enacted,
protectionism is targeted and intentional.
State statutes that erect explicit barriers expressly to isolate a state
from the national union, even in an attempt to solve a legitimate state
problem, are so hostile that another state would likely view the action as
purposefully directed against it. Such explicit isolation from the national
union is strong evidence of protectionist purpose. 81 With all nonexplicit state statutes, the reviewing courts should engage in an "inquiry
to determine whether a decisionmaker considered constitutionally
impermissible factors-or entertained constitutionally impermissible
objectives--in adopting a rule of general applicability."82 In other
areas of constitutional analysis, the Court has occasionally expressed
concerns with judicial review of legislative purpose or motive. 83 In a
seminal article on motive review, Paul Brest identified four primary
objections to general judicial review of legislative or administrative

80. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 114-15 (identifying key
characteristic of motive review as a focus on the process by which the rule was made
and an inquiry if it was made because of an impermissible criteria). See also Laurence
H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the
Problems ofHate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5-11 (establishing
a dichotomy between acting because of, despite, or with unawareness of an external
fact).
81. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
82. Brest, supra note 80, at 114 (defining the archetypal inquiry into "legislative
motivation.").
83. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (rejecting argument that
legislation prohibiting the destruction of draft cards was unconstitutionally enacted
because Congress' purpose was to suppress freedom of speech). See also Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (rejecting argument that city's closing of public pools
violated equal protection because the closures were motivated by anti-integration
considerations). Any doubt the Court created regarding the appi:opriateness of motive
review in equal protection analysis was put to rest in Washington v. Davis, where the
Court held that establishing improper purpose is a necessary condition to presenting a
viable equal protection claim. 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976) (upholding District of
Columbia's test for prospective government employees despite the test's racially
disproportionate impact and expressly disagreeing with the view that proof of
discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary to make out an equal protection violation).
See also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("[E]ven if a
neutral law ha(> a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to
a discriminatory purpose.").
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motive: (1) the ascertainability objection; (2) the futility objection; (3)
the disutility objection; and (4) the impropriety objection. 84 After
examining each objection, Professor (now Dean) Brest concluded, as
have the majority of commentators analyzing motive review, that judicial
inquiry into legislative motive is not only appropriate and valuable, it is
simply not as problematic as it might first appear. 85
In dormant Commerce Clause analysis, just as in other areas, the Court
has appeared to be concerned with delving too deeply into state and
local legislative motive. At times, the Court has gone out of its way not
to second-guess a state legislature and to accept any articulated nonprotectionist purpose that seems to be legitimate. 86 Perhaps substituting
discrimination as a proxy for protectionism has allowed the Court to
avoid the concerns that have long been associated with any general
inquiry into legislative or administrative motive. Yet, an analysis of the
impropriety, ascertainability, and futility objections as they relate

84. See Brest, supra note 80, at 119-30. Ascertainability refers to the argument
that judicial review of motive should be avoided because it is extremely difficult to
determine legislative motivation. Id. at 119. Futility refers to the argument that motive
review is useless because after a law is struck down for improper motive, a legislature
can simply reenact the same law if it articulates different reasons, and the legislature will
take greater care in the future to conceal its illicit objectives. Id. at 125-26. Disutility
refers to the objection that striking down a law for improper motive may result in
striking a "good" law. Id. at 127. Finally, impropriety refers to the argument that
judicial inquiry into legislative motive requires "an undesirable intrusion into the political
process." Id. at 128.
85. See Brest, supra note 80 (making the case for judicial review of legislative and
administrative motivation). See also John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (concluding that the
arguments against motive review have only limited force); Tribe, supra note 80
(concluding that traditional First Amendment protections are not threatened when
legislation identifies an "external" fact and makes culpability dependent on whether the
actor knew the fact and acted either because of it or in spite of it); Regan, supra note
20, at 1143-60 (praising motive review, especially in the dormant Commerce Clause
area, and noting that given the current approval of motive review from the Court and
commentators, he was "tempted to treat it as settled that there is no good general
objection to motive review."). See also Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978).
86. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7
(1981) (rejecting finding by district court that the actual purpose of state legislation was
to "isolate from interstate competition the interests of certain segments of the local dairy
and pulpwood industries" where the legislature had articulated a legitimate environmental
objective and contrary statements from some legislators could be seen as simply an effort
to obtain votes by noting the beneficial side effects on state industry) (citing District
Court's finding of fact No.12 App A-19).
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specifically to the dormant Commerce Clause reveals that judicial motive
review is particularly appropriate and unobjectionable in a dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. 87
The impropriety objection is based on the arguments that a judicial
evaluation of legislative motive is an unwelcome intrusion into the
political process and a judicial determination of impure motive impugns
the integrity of the legislative body evaluated. 88 In dormant Commerce
Clause review, the impropriety objection automatically carries less
weight because unlike a federal judiciary's review of Congressional
motive, a federal court's review of state legislative motive does not
require an evaluation of and pronouncement upon a co-equal branch of
government. 89 Moreover, the impropriety objection to motive review
has some force only when "a judicial determination of illicit motivation
carries an element of insult."90 Yet, as Professor Regan has noted,
although protectionist purpose is unconstitutional, it is not "morally
wtcked."91 Thus, the impropriety objection is less troubling in dormant
Commerce Clause review where a court is not telling a state legislature
that it is attempting to advance racist or bigoted interests, but only that
it is overzealously attempting to protect a segment of its constituents
from the national market. 92
Similarly, concerns with ascertainability and futility do not appear to
be a practical problem in dormant Commerce Clause review. 93 In

87. Professor Brest dealt sufficiently with the so-called "disutility" objection by
simply pointing out that "it confuses the court's competence with that of the
decisionmaker" and it is "beyond the court's normal authority to determine whether a
law is 'good."' Brest, supra note 80, at 127. A further exploration of this objection as
it pertains specifically to dormant Commerce Clause analysis is unnecessary.
88. Brest, supra note 80, at 128-29.
89. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1093-94 n.101 (1969) (arguing that the impropriety objection still applies, but with
less force, to state legislatures).
90. See Brest, supra note 80, at 130.
91. Regan, supra note 20, at 1151 (comparing review for purposeful race
discrimination with review for purposeful protectionism).
92. See Regan, supra note 20, at 1151 ("Most people would probably think the
legislator who promotes protectionism is no more than understandably and forgivably
overzealous in pursuit of his constituents' interests."); Collins, supra note 20, at 121
("protectionism is simply a particular way that state governments aid their people").
93. Professor Regan persuasively dismissed certain aspects of the ascertainability
and futility objections as they pertain to dormant Commerce Clause review. He noted
that recognizing purpose as a key element in a dormant Commerce Clause analysis does
not require legislatures to make a record as a matter of routine; it simply requires some
evidence of innocent motivation for those "very few" laws that carry such a strong
suggestion of bad purpose on their face that it is more probable than not that they were
"substantially motivated" by improper purpose. Regan, supra note 20, at 1159. In
addition, Professor Regan dismissed the concern that two identically worded statutes
might receive different treatment under motive review, noting that many tests, including
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responding to the objection that judicial motive review will be selfdefeating because decisionmakers may take "greater care to conceal their
illicit objectives," Professor Brest suggested that in reality, legislatures
simply may not acknowledge judicial inquiry into motivation; thus, they
may not take measures to conceal their actual purposes. 94 This
suggestion has proved to be prophetic in dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Perhaps because protectionism is considered "understandable, forgivable," and "a permanent temptation to which state legislatures
give in. remarkably frequently considering the clarity of the prohibition
against it,"95 dormant Commerce Clause case law is replete with
straightforward evidence of protectionist purpose that the Court often
seemingly ignores. 96
In dormant Commerce Clause review, ascertaining whether a decision
maker was motivated by constitutionally impermissible protectionist
concerns is often an uncomplicated task. In some cases, statutory

balancing, can produce this very result. Id. at 1160. See also Brest, supra note 80, at
125 ("Judicial review of motivation is not more 'futile' merely because reenactment is
possible [after a 'wiser' speech is made] than appellate review is futile because an
appellee may prevail again on remand after a trial court is reversed for giving weight to
inadmissible evidence or misapplying the law.").
94. Brest, supra note 80, at 125-26.
95. Regan, supra note 20, at 1151.
96. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (discussed infra
note 98 and accompanying text); Kassell v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,
681-82 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority and dissent for asking
the "wrong question" and giving insufficient weight to Iowa's articulated and illegitimate
purpose behind its truck length regulation, which was "to discourage interstate truck
traffic on Iowa highways."); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
475-77 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority failed to give proper
weight to the district court's express findings that despite the purported legislative policy,
the statute was actually enacted to "'promote the economic interests of certain segments'
of the local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense of the economic interests of
other segments of [these industries].") (quoting the trial court); infra notes 120-43 and
accompanying text (discussing Court's analysis in C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383 (1994)). Cf Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504
U.S. 353, 368 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding that majority should have
evaluated the regulation first and foremost for protectionism). See also Korobkin, supra
note 30, at 742 (lawmakers in Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania have "made no
real attempt to disguise the purpose" of laws concerning utilities use of local coal and
the legislative history contains "the 'openly protectionist sentiments' of public officials"
enacting such laws). But cf Regan, supra note 20, at 1092 (Court has actually been
focused on protectionism); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95
(1987) (Scalia J., concurring in judgment) ("If [Regan] is not correct, he ought to be.").
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language, typically the "most reliable indicator" of impermissible
motive, 97 provided express, written evidence of a legislature's protectionist motive. In the recent case of Uyoming v. Oklahoma, for
example, the Court focused on the discrimination inquiry and gave little
express weight to Oklahoma legislature's express resolution that
requiring Oklahoma utilities to use at least ten percent Oklahoma coal
in their blends would assure that "at least a portion of the ratepayer
dollars remain[] in Oklahoma and enhance[] the economy of the State
of Oklahoma."98 In other cases as well, protectionist motive is
candidly admitted by decision makers. 99
When such evidence is considered along with "antecedent and
concurrent events and situations," it can bring to light the motive or
motives underlying legislation. 100 In West Lynn Creamery, for example, the Court noted that the Governor of Massachusetts appointed a
Special Commission to study the state's failing dairy industry. The
Commission concluded that if milk prices were not significantly
increased, the majority of farmers in the state would be "forced out of
business within the year." 101 In response to the Commission's report,
the Governor declared a State of Emergency, concluding that the state
must act to "preserve our local industry [and] maintain reasonable
97. James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment: A Comment on Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 73 OR. L. REV. 345, 366 (demonstrating that analysis of statutory language
rather than disparate impact should be the primary focus when evaluating governmental
purpose behind penalty enhancement laws).
98. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 443. In that case, legislative recitals and resolutions
expressly provided, in pertinent part: "WHEREAS, the use of Oklahoma coal would save
significant freight charges on out-of-state coal from the State of Wyoming; and ...
WHEREAS, the coal-fired electric plants being used by Oklahoma utilities are
exclusively using Wyoming coal; and WHEREAS, the Oklahoma ratepayers are paying
$300 million annually for Wyoming coal; ... NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED
... : THAT the result of [using a blend of at least ten percent Oklahoma coal] would
assure at least a portion of the ratepayer dollars remaining in Oklahoma and enhancing
the economy of the State of Oklahoma." Id. When the law was later amended to
mandate a ten percent minimum Oklahoma coal purchase and direct compliance, the
recitals and resolutions included: "WHEREAS, the passage of this law in 1986 has
provided over 700 new jobs in Oklahoma's coal mining industry and related employment
sectors; and WHEREAS, another benefit of this law is an additional $31 million of
taxable income has been generated through the purchases of Oklahoma mined coal; .
. . ." Id. at 444 n.5.
99. See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (town of Clarkstown candidly admitted
that it's proposed flow control ordinance was a "financing measure" designed to ensure
the town could fund a new state-of-the-art waste transfer station). See also Korobkin,
supra note 30, at 742 (noting numerous local coal use laws where legislative history
contains clear "openly protectionist sentiments" of public officials).
100. See Brest, supra note 80, at 120-24 (examining the use of both circumstantial
and direct evidence to ascertain motivation).
IOI. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 189 (1994) (citing the
Special Commission, App. 13).
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m1mmum prices for the dairy farmers." 102 This ·statement is direct
evidence of the protectionist motive that led to the enactment of the
Massachusetts milk pricing order the Court struck down under the
dormant Commerce Clause. When the direct evidence of the Governor's
purpose underlying the milk pricing order is viewed in light of the
emergency circumstances facing the state, it is not difficult to conclude
that the milk pricing order was in fact intended to protect the local dairy
farmers from interstate competition.
In enacting a piece of legislation, a legislature may be responding to
a number of underlying motivations or incentives. 103 A legislature, for
example, may be motivated, solely or in part, by legitimate safety104
or environmental 105 concerns. Recognizing and giving weight to clear
evidence of protectionist purpose, which is all I argue for here,
comfortably fits within a framework that asks whether an impermissible
purpose played a substantial role in the enactment of the legislation. 106
Thus, state legislation will be "protectionist" under the definition of
protectionism offered here if the record indicates that it was substantially
motivated by the need to protect resident economic interests, or, if in an
attempt to address legitimate concerns, the state isolates itself from the
national economy in a way that affects interstate commerce.
In the end, my thesis is simply this: in dormant Commerce Clause
review, to ignore clear evidence of protectionist purpose is unjustified,

Id. at 190.
Although Professors Regan and Brest, for example, generally agree that it is
not necessary to establish the legislature's "sole" or "dominant" motivation when
reviewing legislation; they disagree on the standard to apply before denouncing
legislation as improperly motivated. Compare Brest, supra note 80, at 119 (concluding
that it is not necessary to establish a decisionmaker's "sole" or "dominant" motivation;
it is sufficient simply to demonstrate that a protectionist motive played a "nontrivial part
in the decision making process" such that it "might have affected the outcome") with
Regan, supra note 20, at 1149 (agreeing that it is not necessary to look for sole or
"dominant" motivation in reviewing legislation under the dormant Commerce Clause, but
arguing that protectionist motive should "contribute substantially" to the adoption of a
law).
104. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (noting that the
propriety of state legislation in the "field of safety" has long been recognized).
105. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (assuming that
New Jersey has "every right to protect its residents' pocketbooks as well as their
environment.").
106. See Regan, supra note 20, at 1149.
102.
I 03.
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unnecessary, and wrong. 107 The working definition of protectionism
offered in this Article demands that, at a minimum, legislative purpose
be evaluated and plain evidence of parochial motive be recognized as a
critical component of economic protectionism and a key factor in
dormant Commerce Clause review.

c.

Magnitude of Impact

A realistic protectionist analysis must continue to assume, despite the
current existence of evidence to the contrary, that a "savvy" state
legislature will not "artlessly disclose" its patently protectionist
motive. 108 To minimize the risk that a State will cloak a protectionist
statute behind a legitimate, proffered purpose, a court is empowered
under the dormant Commerce Clause to disregard a legislature's
articulated purpose if it considers it a pretext. 109 The Court has
frequently noted that "[t]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends." 110 Thus, in dormant Commerce
Clause review, just as in review under the equal protection clause 111

107. See Brest, supra note 80, at 134 ("The main burden of my thesis is simply that
a blanket refusal to inquire into legislative and administrative motivation is not
justified."); Regan, supra note 20, at 1156-57 ("[I]t is foolish to close our eyes to direct
evidence of the legislature's decision process just because such evidence will often be
inconclusive" and "when the direct evidence has some weight . . . it is wrong to ignore
it."). As Justice Brennan noted in a 1981 dormant Commerce Clause opinion: "where
the lawmakers' purposes in enacting a statute are explicitly set forth" or are "clearly
discernible from the legislative history," the Court should not take the "extraordinary
step of disregarding the actual purpose" of the legislation. Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 682-83 n.3 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original).
108. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (assuming an
ordinance is valid simply because it "professes to be a health measure" would limit the
impact of the dormant Commerce Clause to the "rare instance where a state artlessly
discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods").
109. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 476 n.2 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring).
110. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626.
111. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Necessarily, an invidious
discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,
including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than
another."). Interestingly, until the Court made it clear in Washington v. Davis that proof
of discriminatory purpose was necessary to establish an equal protection violation, a
"considerable number of lower courts" assumed that "mere differential effect was a
constitutional violation." Gunther, supra note 26, at 379. The parallel in dormant
Commerce Clause review is apparent as lower courts struggle with defining "discrimination" against interstate commerce. See supra note 35 (noting Court's statement that
neutral statute that discriminates "in effect" subject to per se invalid standard). See also
infra notes 195, 205 (demonstrating breadth of discrimination principle).
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and the First Amendment, 112 a court can and should analyze a statute's
practical effect when deciding if the statute is protectionist. 113
Testing the effect of a statute for protectionism raises another key
factor that distinguishes economic protectionism from discrimination
against interstate commerce--the "magnitude of impact" factor.
Although the existence of discrimination against interstate commerce
does not and should not depend on the magnitude of the discrimination, 114 the existence of economic protectionism certainly may depend
on the magnitude of a statute's impact. The distinction exists because
"discrimination" and "economic protectionism" are two fundamentally
distinct concepts. Discrimination between two groups is a state of being.
It either exists or it does not exist. The underlying legislative motive
and the magnitude of a statute's impact do not alter the existence or
nonexistence of the fact that a statute discriminates against interstate
commerce. Economic protectionism, on the other hand, is not a state of
being; rather, it is a label for a certain type of action or the motivation
underlying that action. Proof of economic protectionism is entirely
dependent on proof of legislative motive. If that proof is missing or
ambiguous, the extent to which a statute impacts those within or without
the state may be probative proof of protectionist motive. 115 Thus, if
a statute's compliance burdens are even slightly disproportionately
imposed out-of-region, while benefits are enjoyed locally, that statute is
theoretically discriminatory. If an analysis of the magnitude of the
impact of compliance burdens reveal that the statute's burdens are
substantially disproportionate, the degree of impact indicates protectionist motive.
To return to the opening hypothetical statutes, consider again the
facially neutral ban on all price advertising of fresh produce. Although
the ban on price advertising applies equally to all retailers, regardless of

112. Weinstein, supra note 97, at 367 ("[D]isparate impact can render the
governmental purpose suspect").
113. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 20, at 1095 (defining protectionist effect as "any
improvement (caused by the statute) in the competitive position of some class of local
economic actors vis-a-vis their foreign competitors" and noting that protectionist effect
is relevant only if it provides significant evidence of a protectionist purpose but effect
does not make a statute protectionist).
114. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing magnitude of
discrimination component).
115. Regan, supra note 20, at 1136 ("[S}ignificant protectionist effect will always
be evidence of protectionist purpose.").
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size or location, interstate retailers would be likely to feel more strongly
the impact of the state's advertising restriction because they typically
buy in higher volume and thus can offer a better price for their produce.
A review of the statute's legislative history may reveal that the state's
smaller farmers and "mom and pop" produce retailers were being
squeezed out of the market by larger, interstate stores. If the state
purposefully designed the no-price-in-advertising statute in an attempt to
neutralize interstate competition and protect the local produce industry
from interstate competition, the statute ought to be dealt a swift blow
under the per se rule of invalidity. Under our definition of economic
protectionism, such a statute would be protectionist because it was
designed to grant a protective economic advantage to local industry and,
by attempting to neutralize interstate competition and manipulate market
share, it used the existence of interstate commerce to grant that
protective benefit. 116
If, on the other hand, the legislative history of the advertising
restriction is uncontroversial or unclear, the statute might nevertheless be
declared a protectionist measure if its effect on interstate commerce is
so substantial that a seemingly legitimate health rationale must be seen
as suspect. The legislature might offer an ostensible health rationale to
explain the statute. 117 Yet, if the challengers to the advertising statute
present a record on the magnitude of the statute;s impact, demonstrating
that by manipulating competition on the interstate market the statute
grants substantial protection to local farmers and small retailers, the
proffered purpose should be granted less deference and the statute ought
to be treated as a protectionist measure. 118
Unlike a discrimination analysis, a court's evaluation of a statute's
impact for purposes of determining whether the statute is protectionist
will not require a precise comparison of resident benefits to competing
non-resident burdens. Rather, in a review for protectionism, a court will
be expressly concerned with the magnitude of the statute's protectionist
effect, evaluating the statute's economic impact on residents as a whole
and asking whether it appears to be so great that it indicates an
underlying protectionist motive.
Thus, distinguishing economic
protectionism from discrimination allows courts to evaluate honestly the
degree or magnitude of a statute's impact before applying the strict per

116. See supra text accompanying note 60 (offering working definition of economic
protectionism).
117. They might assert a desire to shift retailers' focus to freshness instead of price,
for example.
118. See supra text accompanying note 60 (offering working definition of economic
protectionism).
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se invalid rule, without resorting to ambiguous or meaningless modifiers.119
C.

Protectionist or Discriminatory?
Answering the Right Question

A recent case illustrates the distinction between protectionism and
discrimination, and demonstrates that the Court's insistence on using the
discrimination test as the sole model for dormant Commerce Clause
review causes it to struggle to reach a correct result when facts do not
fit logically within the discrimination paradigm. In C & A Carbone, Inc.
v. Clarkstown, 120 the Court virtually ignored evidence of purposeful
protectionism to focus instead on the details of a discrimination analysis.
In the end, the Court reached the right result but it answered the wrong
question.
.
In Carbone, the Court invalidated a local flow control ordinance under
the dormant Commerce Clause. The ordinance required, under threat of
a $1,000 fine and up to 15 days in jail, that all solid waste recyclers and
haulers process their waste at one local designated transfer station before
shipping it beyond the municipality into the stream of commerce. 121
The local ordinance burdened all waste recyclers, haulers, and distributors, regardless of whether they resided in or out of the town of
Clarkstown.
The transfer station's contractor was permitted to charge waste haulers
a tipping fee that exceeded the disposal cost of unsorted waste on the
private market, thus ensuring the :financing of the facility with the
income generated from the tipping fees. 122 The town of Clarkstown
freely admitted that the purpose of the ordinance was to "retain the
processing fees charged at the transfer station to amortize the cost of the
facility." 123 The transfer station cost approximately $1.4 million to
build and it was the town's response to numerous illegal dumping
citations it had received from the New York State Department of

119. See supra note 55 (noting Court's use of modifiers to describe invalid
discrimination).
120. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
121. Id. at 387.
122. Id. at 384.
123. Id. at 386.
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Environmental Conservation. 124 The ordinance was, in essence, a
"financing measure" designed to trap locally a service provided in the
national market to ensure that the expensive transfer station would be
built and would survive in the town of Clarkstown. 125
In its review of Clarkstown's flow control ordinance, the Court
relegated its analysis around what it determined to be the central inquiry
in dormant Commerce Clause review-whether the ordinance "discriminated" against interstate commerce. 126 Havin~ embraced a two-tiered
discrimination-focused analysis as its model,1 7 the Court was forced
to find interstate discrimination in a case where no geographic origin
existed to form the foundation for comparisons. 128 The Court did not
engage in any form of comparison analysis between similarly situated
resident economic interests and nonresident economic interests.
Moreover, the Court did not attempt to apply the inner political check
doctrine to analyze the fairness of the local democratic process. 129 The
Court instead simply analogized the case to other mandatory in-state
processing cases in which local ordinances were found to discriminate
against interstate commerce. 130 The Court recognized and gave weight
to the protectionist effect of the flow control ordinance only to buttress
its cursory conclusion that the ordinance discriminated. 131 Moreover,
the Court gave little attention to Clarkstown's admitted purpose that the
ordinance was a "financing measure" designed to ensure that the town's
facility would be profitable. 132

124. Id. at 387. The State Department of Environmental Conservation had issued
citations against Clarkstown for illegal dumping over the course of a decade. In a 1989
consent decree, the town settled its problems with the Department by agreeing to close
its local landfill and open this new solid waste transfer station on the same site. Id.
125. Id. at 394.
126. Id. at 389-90.
127. Id. (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause inquiry required "two lines of
analysis: first, whether the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce [citation
omitted]; and second, whether the ordinance imposes a burden on interstate commerce
that is 'clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits,' [citing Pike]."). See
also infra note 194 (collecting cases to demonstrate the evolution of the "two-tiered"
approach to dormant Commerce Clause review).
128. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that by its very nature, the
discrimination analysis requires a comparison of economic interests).
129. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (describing the inner political
check doctrine as a test for discrimination in the local political process).
130. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391.
131. Id. at 392 (noting that the protectionist effect of the ordinance was made "more
acute" because it favored a single local proprietor thus squelching even the possibility
of any competition for the waste-processing service).
132. Id. The Court evaluated the purpose of the ordinance, not to determine
whether it was protectionist and thus deserving of the strictest per se invalid scrutiny,
but rather as a part of determining whether Clarkstown had "other means to advance a
legitimate local interest" under the per se invalid standard. Id.
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In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the Clarkstown ordinance discriminated against interstate
commerce, concluding that the ordinance could not be said to "discriminate" against interstate commerce when all competitors of the preferred
transfer facility, whether in-town competitors or out-of-town competitors,
were burdened equally. Coining an oxymoron, Justice O'Connor noted
that, at best, the ordinance might be said to "discriminate evenhandedly"
against all waste processors, "while benefiting only the chosen operator
of the transfer facility." 133 She noted that all the mandatory in-state
processing cases relied on by the majority share a significant feature
lacking in Clarkstown's local flow control ordinance---they discriminated
on the basis. of geographic origin. 134 All prior precedent involved a
jurisdiction, whether it be a state, county, or city, drawing a line around
itself and treatin~ "those inside the line more favorably than those
outside the line." 35 Justice O'Connor concluded that the Clarkstown
ordinance was nondiscriminatory. She then determined that because the
ordinance was nondiscriminatory, it must be analyzed under Pike s more
flexible balancing standard. 136
Flow control ordinances cannot be said to "discriminate" against
interstate commerce under any honest definition of discrimination. As
we have seen, to determine whether an ordinance "discriminates" against
interstate commerce, a court must, at a minimum, identify the impact of
the ordinance on the economic interests affected by the ordinance and
determine if disparities exist between local (or intrastate) interests and
nonlocal (or interstate) interests. To remain true to the definition of

133. Id. at 404.
134. Id. at 403 (noting that each enactment "gave a competitive advantage to local
business as a group vis-a-vis their out-of-state or nonlocal competitors as a group.").
135. Id.
136. Id. at 405. Justice O'Connor found that the ordinance could not survive review,
even under Pike's balancing standard. Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Blackmun, dissented, reasoning that the Clarkstown flow control ordinance
should not be struck under the dormant Commerce Clause because instead of favoring
a class of local private businesses, it favored only one proprietor, who was essentially
an agent of the municipal government performing a "traditional government responsibility." Id. at 411. The dissent argued the because the flow control ordinance did not
discriminate against trash processors on the basis of geography, any protectionist effect
was "substantially mitigate[d]," for "subjecting out-of-town investors and facilities to the
same constraints as local ones is not economic protectionism." Id. at 418. The dissent,
therefore, concluded that "discrimination" must be present before a local ordinance can
be deemed a "protectionist" measure.
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discrimination and the policies underlying its usefulness in dormant
Commerce Clause review, a court should respect the anti-discrimination
principle's aim for equality or near equality in both the impact of the
local legislation and the process of enacting the legislation. In Carbone,
however, the Court did not evaluate where the benefits and burdens of
the flow control ordinance fell to determine if "differential treatment of
in-state and out-of-state economic interests" existed that "benefit[ted] the
former and burden[ed] the latter." 137 Had the Carbone Court attempted to engage in any form of discrimination comparison analysis, it would
have had to confront the fact that the Clarkstown ordinance burdened
every waste processor, whether located out-of-state, in-state, or even
within the very town of Clarkstown, 138 with the sole exception of the
single processor selected by the city to process the waste. The single
benefited facility certainly cannot be defined as "intrastate" commerce,
with every other facility within the city and beyond classified as
"interstate" commerce, under any reasonable· understanding of those
terms.
Graph A illustrates flow control's impact on interstate commerce under
a discrimination analysis. With one exception, all waste treatment
plants, whether located within flow control State A or outside State A,
are burdened by the flow control legislation. If anything, the waste
treatment facilities within State A are burdened more than similar
facilities outside State A because the flow control ordinance will put
them out of business completely.
·
Graph A

Analyzing Flow Control Under the Discrimination Model
Key: State A= The Flow Control State

IT] = The favored waste treatment plant
in flow control State A
@ = All other similar waste treatment plants·
W = Waste distributors

Analysis:

.Al! (r) s are negatively affected.
State A's@s bear a heavier
burden because they are put out
of business.
.All W s are negatively affected.
State A's W s bear a heavier burden
because they cannot go elsewhere.

137. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (quoting the widely-accepted Oregon
Waste definition of discrimination).
138. Indeed, the primary petitioner in the Carbone litigation was a recycling center
located in Clarkstown. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
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Moreover, flow control ordinances burden not only waste treatment
facilities, but all who wish to use their services. Waste distributors, for
example, both in and out-of-state are burdened by flow control. The
waste distributors within State A are all burdened by the ordinance
because they are prohibited from taking their business to any other waste
treatment facility. Out-of-state distributors are also burdened because
they have been robbed of State A's competitive presence in the waste
treatment market. Yet, out-of-state distributors are not burdened as
much as in-state distributors because they are not forced by a local
ordinance to go to a certain facility and pay a higher fee. Thus, once
again, when comparing similar economic interests, the entities within
State A bear most heavily the burdens of the flow control ordinance.
It is difficult to imagine anyone concluding that such an ordinance
discriminates in favor of State A's intrastate economic players and
against interstate commerce. When applying the inner political check
doctrine, any court would have to look on a flow control ordinance with
favor because the burdens of the ordinance are borne primarily by those
with a substantial voice in the local legislative process. Thus, under any
test for discrimination against interstate commerce, flow control survives.
On the other hand, a flow control ordinance is plainly protectionist
under our working definition of economic protectionism. In building the
treatment facility, the town of Clarkstown sought to provide a valuable
service to its citizens. The treatment facility would presumably take care
of the problems Clarkstown had encountered with the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, which had cited the town
for dumping its waste in violation of environmental laws. 139 Moreover, the treatment center would undoubtedly help the town's economy
by providing new jobs. But such a facility is extraordinarily expensive
to build and operate. The town enacted the flow control ordinance to
trap a service within its borders that could otherwise be obtained on the
national market, eliminate interstate competition for that service, charge
a higher price for that service, and thereby guarantee :financing for the
new waste treatment plant. Although the purposes behind building the
waste treatment facility were multi-faceted and undoubtedly included
environmental concerns, the purpose behind the flow control ordinance

139.

Id. at 412.
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itself was economic. 140 Evidence of protectionist motive was absolutely clear in this record---the town conceded that the motivation behind the
ordinance was somehow to find the funds to ensure that an expensive,
state-of-the-art waste treatment facility could be built within its
borders. 141
Under our working definition of protectionism,
Clarkstown's ordinance purposefully used interstate commerce to find
those funds, thus isolating itself from the national market and granting
a protective advantage to its own residents. 142
Thus, the Carbone case provides an example of a local ordinance that
is a protectionist measure, but not a "discriminatory" one. Notwithstanding the plain evidence of protectionism, the Carbone Court insisted on
finding "discrimination" before applying the rule of per se invalidity.
Moreover, in her concurrence, Justice O'Connor, who had correctly
concluded that this ordinance could not logically be said to discriminate,
completely ignored all evidence of protectionism in deciding that the
lowest level of scrutiny should apply to the Court's review of the flow
control ordinance. In doing so, she simply failed to consider whether
protectionism might be a concept distinct from discrimination.
The unfortunate lesson from Carbone is that under current Supreme
Court jurisprudence, an ordinance must be found to "discriminate"
against interstate commerce before it can be declared invalid under per
se rules of invalidity. Lower courts are now interpreting Carbone to
mean that an ordinance can "discriminate" even if it treats in-state and
out-of-state interests exactly the same. 143 In fact, this case could have
been much more easily and candidly decided had the Court focused on
the elements of economic protectionism, declaring the town's mandatory
processing ordinance per se invalid for the real reason it offends the
dormant Commerce Clause.
D.

Protectionist or Discriminatory?
Obtaining the Correct Result

The distinction between economic protectionism and discrimination is
further illustrated by the fact that the fate of a local ordinance may
directly depend on whether a court focuses on economic protectionism
or discrimination in its dormant Commerce Clause review. In CTS

140. See Waste System Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1389 (8th Cir.
1993) (purpose behind local flow control ordinance was solely economic).
141. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410.
142. See supra text accompanying note 60 (offering working definition of economic
protectionism).
143. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1277, 1287 (W.D. Va.
1994).
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Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. Of America, 144 for example, the six-justice
majority and three-justice dissent arrived at opposite results, dependent
in-part on whether the justices were concerned about prohibiting
discrimination or prohibiting protectionism.
The Indiana statute at issue in CTS regulated corporate tender offers
by giving shareholders in Indiana corporations the right to vote on
whether an entity acquiring controlling shares in their corporation should
also acquire voting rights. In essence, the State statute conditioned
"acquisition of control of a corporation on approval of a majority of the
pre-existing disinterested shareholders."145
The CTS majority began its dormant Commerce Clause review by
noting that "[t]he principal objects of dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce.;'146
Without analyzing or even mentioning economic protectionism, the
Court determined that the statute did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause because it did not facially discriminate against interstate
commerce. 147 The Court noted that the Indiana Act made it more
difficult for any offeror to take over an Indiana corporation, but it did
not impose a greater burden on out-of-state offerors than on "similarly
situated Indiana offerors." 148 Thus, the Court determined that the
statute passed muster because its effects were visited equally upon instate and out-of-state offerors. 149 In concluding that the statute did not
discriminate, the majority refused to look deeply beyond the face of the
statute into the statute's purpose or its effects, summarily rejecting the
argument that the burdens of the statute will apply most often to out-ofstate offerors. 150
In contrast, the three dissenting justices focused in part on protectionism principles to conclude that the statute was invalid under the dormant
Commerce Clause. Unlike the majority, the dissent questioned whether
the underlying purpose of the Indiana Act was protectionist, noting that
.the State of Indiana admitted in its brief that one of its legislative goals
was to "protect Indiana corporations" from liquidation or removal

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

481 U.S. 69 (1987).
Id. at 74.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88.
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outside the state. 151 The dissent emphasized the State's repeated
admission that the Indiana Act permitted "shareholders (who may also
be community residents or employees or suppliers of the corporation) to
determine the intentions of any offeror concerning the liquidation of the
company or its possible removal from the State." 152 Moreover, the
dissent criticized the majority for ignoring the practical impact of the
statute on the transfer of shares in the interstate market, accusing it of
"see[ing] the trees but not the forest." 153 The dissent concluded that
the Indiana statute presented the "very type of economic protectionism"
the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent. 154 Thus, a specific
focus on whether the intent of a facially neutral statute is to protect
resident businesses from the interstate market may dictate a very
different fate for the statute under the dormant Commerce Clause than
if simply examined on the surface for facial discrimination.
SECTION Two

Section One established that protectionism and discrimination against
interstate commerce are two distinct concepts that demand a different
focus and sometimes support different results. Before offering the
"protectionist-first" model as an alternative in dormant Commerce Clause
review, this Section tracks the evolution of dormant Commerce Clause
review tests to determine how the discrimination test has come to enjoy
such prominence in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and to
demonstrate the confusion that currently exists in the lower courts.

IL

EVOLUTION OF THE TWO-TIERED DISCRIMINATION
REVIEW MODEL

The current discrimination-based review test emerged from the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence after more than a century of
experimentation with a number of broadly defined and subjective
dormant Commerce Clause tests. 155 In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall

151. Id. at 100.
152. Id. at 101.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 100. The dissent did not analyze whether the statute would in effect
burden out-of-state tender offerors more than their in-state counterparts; rather, it noted
that appellant CTS' stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange with daily
buyers and sellers from all over the country. In concluding that the statute was
protectionist, the dissent was apparently content to question the purpose of the statute
and note the practical national restraint on interstate trade. Id. at 99-101.
155. Cf id. at 87 (noting that "the Court has articulated a variety of tests in an
attempt to describe the difference between those regulations that the [dormant]
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articulated the first dormant Commerce Clause review test: a "police
power" test that recognized a state's authority "to act directly on its
system of police" without interference from the dormant Commerce
Clause. 156 Ultimately, the police power test eluded all attempts at
definition because it was considered a response to the ever-changing
dynamics of our society. 157 The next dormant Commerce Clause test
to gain wide acceptance originated in 1851 when Justice Benjamin Curtis
wrote that Congress had exclusive power under the Commerce Clause
to regulate subjects that were so "national" in character they demanded
a, uniform rule throughout the country, while states could regulate
subjects that were so "local" in character they demanded diverse
treatment. 158 The Cooley opinion .had a considerable impact on
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, sparking a new "local activity
verses national activity" inquiry. 159

Commerce Clause permits and those regulations it prohibits.").
156. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 204 (1824). At the outset, Chief
Justice Marshall attempted to define the police power test by describing certain rights
that he determined the states did not surrender to the federal government. Id. at 203
(States have the right to enact "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State."); See also
New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 133 (1837). This definition proved
unworkable, and Marshall struggled in subsequent cases to enhance his police power list
to accommodate a wide variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251 (1829) (relying in substantial part on a State's
interest in protecting the value of property to conclude that Delaware properly authorized
the construction of a dam which obstructed an interstate commerce waterway).
157. Frankfurter, supra note 21, at 27; See also Stone v. Mississippi, IOI U.S. 814,
818 (1879) (Waite, C.J.) ("Many attempts have been made in this court and elsewhere
to define the police power, but never with entire success."); RUTH LOCKE ROEITINGER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER A STUDY IN FEDERALISM 11 (1957)
("What 'State police power' really meant in Taney's day and has meant ever since is the
use of state laws to do things that a majority of the Justices, at any given time, do not
strongly disapprove of the state's doing--nothing more, nothing less.") (quoting Fred
Rodell).
158. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851); Wabash, St.
Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 571 (1886) (overruling Peik v.
Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1876)) (the cumulative burdens which would be
imposed if all states attempted similar but inconsistent local legislation would be too
disruptive on interstate commerce).
159. Classifying regulatory subject matter as 'national' or 'local,' [however], like
the earlier dichotomy between 'police' and 'commerce,' proved to be more conclusory
than explanatory. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 408 (2d ed.
1988). See also PAUL R. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
1937-1970, at 35-41 (1970) (subsequent dormant Commerce Clause tests were the
byproduct of the Court's struggle to discern which subjects were "local" and which were
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Eventually, the Court's focus shifted from the subject matter of the
activity regulated----whether it was a "local" activity or a "police power"
activity-to the actual impact of the activity on interstate commerce-whether it sought to impose a "direct" burden on interstate
commerce. 160 Although asking whether a state action impacts interstate commerce "directly" or whether it has only an "indirect" or
"incidental" effect on interstate commerce is an enduring theme in
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 161 this test has been fairly
criticized as result-oriented, subjective, mechanical, uncertain, and "too
remote from actualities, to be of value." 162
Although the language of these past tests occasionally surfaces in the
contemporary Court's dormant Commerce Clause review, 163 Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. signaled a new era of inquiry, suggesting that courts
should focus on whether state or local legislation "discriminates" against
"national").
160. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 488 (1877) (holding that "State legislation
which seeks to impose a direct burden upon inter-state commerce, or to interfere directly
with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress.").
161. Justice Stewart borrowed from the legacy of the direct/indirect burden test
when establishing the framework of the Court's current analysis. See Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that if an evenhanded statute with a
legitimate local purpose has effects on interstate commerce that are "only incidental,"
it will enjoy a more lenient level of scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.)
162. DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting) (noting
that in "making use of the expressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference' with
commerce, [the Court is] doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather
than any trustworthy formula by which it is reached"). See also Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Heintz, 760 F.2d 1408, 1421-22 (4th Cir. 1985) (criticizing the direct/indirect
burden analysis as analytically unsound and results-oriented).
163. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. Of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87-94 (1987) (noting
that the Court has articulated a "variety of tests" to review local regulations under the
dormant Commerce Clause, and upholding a state statute that regulated corporate tender
offers largely because such regulation is traditionally controlled by states rather than
being of national character); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (holding that an admittedly evenhanded state statute violated
the Commerce Clause under the "virtually per se" invalid standard because the statute
directly regulated commerce in other states); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)
(holding that the Illinois Takeover Act was unconstitutional because it purported to
regulate directly interstate commerce); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. at
383 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that municipal legislation ought to enjoy more
lenient scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause when the legislation directly aids
local government in satisfying a "traditional governmental responsibility"); Id. at 406
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (relying on the continuing legacy of Cooley to note that local
legislation must be evaluated by considering how the challenged statute would interact
with the regulatory regimes of other states, and noting that the increasing number of
similar local ordinances across the country virtually ensures some inconsistencies
burdening interstate commerce). Interestingly, the majority in Cooley noted the existence
of similar legislation in other states to bolster its conclusion that the subject matter of
the legislation should be locally regulated. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299,312 (1851).
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interstate commerce. 164 In Pike, perhaps the most frequently cited case
on contemporary dormant Commerce Clause review, 165 the Supreme
Court articulated a dormant Commerce Clause review test that suggested
courts should judge discriminatory legislation under a different standard
than legislation that is nondiscriminatory. 166
In Pike, the Court struck down an Arizona statute requiring that fruit
and vegetable producers crate their product within the state, labeling it
as Arizona produce, before exporting the product to other states. 167 In
what is certainly the most frequently quoted paragraph in contemporary
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Pike Court decided that
"[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. " 168 The Court noted that discriminatory statutes should be subject
to stricter scrutiny from a reviewing court, and it declared. statutes
requiring that business operations take place within a certain state
"virtually per se illegal." 169 Interestingly, however, the Court did not
apply this "virtually per se illegal" test to Arizona's requirement that all
Arizona-grown produce be crated within the state. Although the statute

164. Although early donnant Commerce Clause review did not revolve around the
question of discrimination, the Court has arguably been silently concerned about
discrimination against interstate commerce for a long time. See JOHN E. NowAK ET AL.,
CONSTITIJTIONAL LAW 278 (4th ed. 1991) (noting that the state legislation upheld in
Willson did not discriminate against foreign shipping in favor of local shipping in
contrast to the New York statute rejected in Gibbons which plainly did). The Court
expressed its concern for protecting against discrimination as early as 1938 when it
detennined that the Commerce Clause prohibits regulations that "gain for those within
the state an advantage at the expense of those without." South Carolina Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938).
165. See Smith, supra note 26, at 1256.
166. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 145.
167. Id. at 146.
168. Id. at 142. Analyzing whether the burden imposed on commerce is "clearly
excessive" when compared to the putative benefits is the donnant Commerce Clause
analysis commonly referred to as "balancing." The Court detennined further that the
extent of the burden tolerated would "depend on the nature of the local interest involved
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities." Id.
169. Id. at 145.
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in Pike was arguably discriminatory on its face, 170 the Court did not
evaluate the statute's discriminatory impact, opting instead to analyze the
statute under the new "balancing" standard it established for nondiscriminatory, evenhanded regulations. 171 Thus the Pike decision is typically
cited for introducing and embracing a balancing test for dormant
Commerce Clause review. 172 Yet, the Court framed its balancing test
around a statute's "even-handedness," setting the stage for the emergence
of a discrimination-focused model of dormant Commerce Clause review.
In the years immediately following Pike, the Court struggled to define
its new dormant Commerce Clause standards. In some cases, the Court
continued to ignore the idea that only "even-handed" regulations with
"incidental" effects on interstate commerce should be evaluated under
Pike :S more lenient balancing standard. Instead, the Court went straight
to balancing the burden any regulation might place on interstate
commerce with the local interest the regulation was thought to protect.
For example, in the first case to rely on Pike, the Court applied the
balancing test to a Mississippi regulation providing that out-of-state milk
could be sold in Mississippi only if the other state accepted Mississippi
milk on a reciprocal basis. 173 Without questioning whether the
regulation was "even-handed" or not, the Court simply relied on the
"general rule" enunciated in Pike and concluded that the burden the
regulation placed on the free :flow of interstate commerce was excessive
in relation to the State's interest in maintaining its health standards. 174
170. Although the Arizona statute imposed its crating requirements on all dealers
of Arizona-grown produce, regardless of their location, its in-state processing
requirement facially discriminated in favor of in-state packing facilities and against
similar out-of-state facilities. The statute benefited only in-state produce processors who
either operated local packaging plants or found it cost effective to use local packaging
facilities. The statute's burdens fell primarily on out-of-state processors, but also
impacted in-state producers who found it more cost effective to use out-of-state
packaging facilities. See supra notes 24, 36-44 and accompanying text (defining
discrimination). That some would argue that the Arizona statute was nondiscriminatory
serves to underscore the difficulty of understanding and applying the discrimination test.
See Brief/or Petitioner, Camps Newfound/Owatonna, supra note 66 (concluding that the
statute in Pike did not discriminate on its face because "it applied to all fruit wherever
sold and to all dealers wherever located.").
171. The Pike Court determined that Arizona's interest in having Arizona's high
quality melons packaged in Arizona and marked as Arizona cantaloupe was "minimal
at best" and outweighed by the burden placed on out-of-state producers. Pike, 397 U.S.
at 145-46.
172. See supra note 10.
173. See Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 376 (1976).
174. Id. at 371-76. The regulation in Great At/. & Pac. Tea Co. was plainly not
"even-handed" under any definition of discrimination. By its t!)rms, it did not even
apply to in-state milk producers. The regulation's burdens fell solely on out-of-state
producers, who would be permitted to sell their milk in Mississippi only if they signed
a reciprocity agreement. The regulation's benefits were bestowed entirely on resident
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In another case, the Court appeared to embrace a general balancing test
for all cases when it indicated that it was only necessary to decide
whether certain state regulations were discriminatory if that determination had some bearing in the balancing of burdens analysis. 175
In other cases, the Court attempted to adhere to the language of the
Pike test and evaluate first whether a state statute discriminated against
interstate commerce. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission, 176 for example, the Court differentiated between the
analysis appropriate for a discriminatory state statute and the analysis
appropriate for a neutral, nondiscriminatory statute. In Hunt, the Court
evaluated a North Carolina statute requiring that all closed containers of
apples sold in the state bear either the United States grade or no grade
at all. 177 In its analysis, the Court first carefully analyzed the discriminatory impact of this facially neutral statute, concluding that the statute
did indeed discriminate in effect against out-of-state industry to the
benefit of local industry. 178 The Court then applied the test established
by the Pike decision for discriminatory legislation, concluding that the
State could not justify the statute "in terms of the local. benefits flowing

milk producers, who were protected from non-resident competition unless they too had
an opportunity to sell their product out-of-state.
175. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). In
Raymond Motor, the Court heard a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to Wisconsin
regulations that governed the length and configuration of trucks that could operate within
the state. Although the regulations were facially neutral, the regulatory scheme
contained a number of exemptions to the general prohibitions that benefited only local,
Wisconsin industries. Id. at 446-47. The Court did not determine whether such
exemptions rendered the regulations discriminatory and thus subject to a stricter review
test Instead, the Court relied on the Pike balancing test, noting the exemptions as an
afterthought that simply lent force to the conclusion that the regulations imposed an
undue burden on interstate commerce. Id.
176. Hunt v. Washington Apple, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
177. Id. at 353.
178. The Court noted that the statute was neutral on its face because it applied to
resident as well as non-resident apple producers. But, unlike the North Carolina apple
industry, the Washington apple industry had developed its own superior grading
standards and would be forced to change its marketing practices to comply with the
North Carolina statute. Thus, the Court found that the statute effectually discriminated
against Washington producers in favor of North Carolina producers because the statute
(1) raised the costs of doing business for Washington apple producers but left North
· Carolina producers unaffected, (2) stripped away the advantages Washington earned for
itself through its own expensive inspection and grading system, and (3) leveled the
competitive advantage Washington enjoyed, insidiously operating to the advantage of
local apple producers. Id. at 350-53.
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from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve the local interests at stake." 179 Unlike Pike and
Cottrell, the Court in Hunt did not automatically balance the burden on
commerce against local benefits without regard to whether the statute
was discriminatory. By determining initially that the statute was
discriminatory, and then placing the burden on the State to show both
that the statute promoted the state's interest and that nondiscriminatory
alternatives were unavailable, the Hunt Court remained true to the
language in Pike and the Court's developing Commerce Clause
analysis. 180
Although strong evidence of protectionist motive existed in cases like
Hunt, 181 it was not until a 1978 seminal dormant Commerce Clause
opinion that the Court focused its review of a state statute on identifying
and prohibiting economic protectionism. 182 In Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, the Court specifically defined the "crucial inquiry" in dormant
Commerce Clause review as one directed to determining whether a
statute is "basically a protectionist measure." 183 The Court began its
review of a New Jersey statute that sought to block out-of-state waste
from entering the state by identifying the dormant Commerce Clause's
basic purpose as ensuring that the entire Nation, not individual States,
be considered our "economic unit." 184 The Court noted without
elaboration that "through the years" its opinions had reflected "an
alertness to the evils of 'economic isolation' and protectionism."185
In analyzing the New Jersey statute for protectionism, the Court began
with legislative motive, quoting the purpose of the statute as it was
specifically described in the legislation itself. 186 The Court recognized
that the parties in the litigation presented two radically different
rationales for the legislation. The State of New Jersey argued that the
legislation was designed to protect the State's environment, not its
economy, and that it was not "motivated by financial concerns or
economic protectionism." 187 The statute's challengers, on the other

179. Id. at 353.
180. Id. at 353-54. The Hunt Court found that the discriminatory state statute
violated the dormant Commerce Clause, not because it was "virtually per se invalid" or
because it imposed an "undue burden" on interstate commerce, but because it did little
to promote the state's interest and nondiscriminatory alternatives were readily available.
181. See id. at 352.
182. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
183. Id. at 624.
184. Id. at 623 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38
(1948)).
185. Id. at 623.
186. Id. at 625.
187. Id.
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hand, argued that this statute, although "outwardly cloaked in the
currently fashionable garb of environmental protection, [was] actually no
more than a legislative effort to suppress competition and stabilize the
cost of solid waste disposal for New Jersey residents." 188 The Court,
however, did not attempt to resolve the dispute over motive. Rather, it
opted to look for the "evil of protectionism" in "legislative means"
instead of "legislative ends." 189 In the end, it found the New Jersey
statute unconstitutionally protectionist, largely because it discriminated
both "on its face and in its plain effect" against an article of commerce
based entirely on the article's origin. 190
Thus, the Philadelphia Court characterized "discrimination," not as the
ultimate evil deserving of the strictest judicial scrutiny, but simply as a
test for the true dormant Commerce Clause evil-----state protectionism.
The Court recognized that a legislative protective wall or barrier was the
"clearest example" of protectionist legislation. 191 In emphasizing that
economic protectionism was the primary evil the dormant Commerce
Clause was designed to prohibit under a per se rule of invalidity, the
Philadelphia Court suggested that general antidiscrimination concerns
should be subordinated to overriding concerns for preventing protectionism.
In a few cases following Philadelphia, the Court expressed plainly its
concern about the protectionist nature of local legislation that was
specifically designed to limit interstate competition or promote local
industry. 192 Moreover, the Court has occasionally noted that local

188. Id. at 625-26.
189. Id. at 626.
190. Id. at 628.
191. Id. at 624. In striking down the statute under the strict virtually per se invalid
standard, the Court commented that any law that "overtly blocks the flow of interstate
commerce at a State's borders" is the "clearest example" of protectionist legislation.
Later in the opinion, the Court again emphasized that the "crucial" factor in that case
was "the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by
erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade." Id. at 628.
192. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (Court begins its
analysis by examining Hawaii's purpose in exempting certain local liquors from an
alcohol tax, and concluding that the State was not entitled to more flexible scrutiny
where its purpose was to "encourage and promote the establishment of a new industry"
and to "help in stimulating the local fruit wine industry."); Lewis v. BT Investment
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 39 (1980) (Court gave great weight to the "parochial"
nature of a Florida regulation limiting entry of out-of-state banks, bank holding
companies, and trust companies in the local investment advisory market, noting that the
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protectionist efforts may "excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures
the Constitution was designed to prevent." 193 In general, however, the
notion that a regulation ought to be evaluated primarily to determine if
it is protectionist has received scant express support as the Court
embraced discrimination against interstate commerce as the primary
inquiry. Eventually, courts began to define dormant Commerce Clause
analysis as a "two-tiered" approach that begins by asking whether a State
statute discriminates against interstate commerce and thus should be
"struck down without further inquiry." 194 The second step of the twotiered analysis, applying the more lenient balancing test, is necessary
only if a court determines that a state statute "has only indirect effects
on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly." 195 In applying
its contemporary two-tiered analysis, the Court has focused entirely on
the threshold question of whether the state law in question discriminates
against interstate commerce. 196 In recent decisions, the Court has

legislature's principal objective was to limit competition). Furthermore, in Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), two Justices refused to participate in
a discussion of the appropriate deference to grant local highway safety regulations,
instead voting to strike down an Iowa truck-length statute because the State intended it
as a "protectionist" measure. Id. at 681-688 (Brennan J., joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring).
193. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) (one state permitted to sue another after the private
litigants dropped out of the litigation because of the impact on the state).
194. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
578-79 (1986). See also C & A Carbone, 511 U,S. at 383 (dormant Commerce Clause
review proceeds along two lines of analysis); Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1511 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Barber v. Hawaii, 42
F.3d 1185, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer
Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 824-26 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Amy M. Petragnani, The
Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1217 n.9
(1994)(citing cases and commentary describing the analysis as a two-tier approach).
195. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579; see also Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that if a statute did not engage in "patent
discrimination" against interstate commerce, a court could evaluate the statute under the
more flexible approach outlined in Pike). Under this prong, the Court will ask whether
the State's interest is "legitimate" and whether, on balance, "the burden on interstate
commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits." Id.
196. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342-43 n.5
(1992) (identifying "patent discrimination" against interstate commerce as the key
inquiry); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (concluding that "[i]n determining
whether a State has overstepped its role in regulating interstate commerce, this Court has
distinguished between state statutes that burden interstate transactions only incidentally,
and those that affirmatively discriminate against such transactions."); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979) (citing Pike as the "general rule" in dormant
Commerce Clause cases and focusing entirely on the inquiry into discrimination). See
also Korobkin, supra note 33 at 740 ("The most important doctrinal question in dormant
Commerce Clause cases, then, is whether the state law in question discriminates against
interstate commerce or merely incidentally burdens it."). The Court has consistently
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clearly indicated its intent to decide first whether a regulation discriminates against interstate commerce and should thus be analyzed, and most
likely declared invalid, under the strict per se rule of invalidity. 197
More importantly, the current Court seems willing to "balance" a
statute's competing considerations only after :first determining that the
regulation does not discriminate against interstate commerce. 198
Thus, the "general rule" from Pike has evolved. Instead of reading
Pike as an invitation to courts to balance benefits against burdens in all
cases, Pike has evolved as the impetus for the contemporary two-tiered
model of dormant Commerce Clause review that focuses :first and
foremost on the question of whether a statute discriminates against
interstate commerce. By opting to focus on discriminatory effect and
granting little express weight to evidence of a protectionist purpose, the
Court has undermined the importance of preventing local protectionism. 199 Eventually, notions of economic protectionism and discrimina-

failed to inquire whether a statute "directly regulates" interstate commerce, as
contemplated by the first step of the analysis, in favor of focusing exclusively on the
discrimination inquiry. But see Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 573 (Court
applies per se invalid standard after finding that a nondiscriminatory statute directly
regulates commerce in other states); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Court
focuses on whether statute directly regulates interstate commerce).
197. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't ofEnvtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)
("the first step in analyzing any law subject to judicial scrutiny under the negative
Commerce Clause is to determine whether it 'regulates evenhandedly' with only
'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate
commerce."); cf West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (focusing
primarily on the discrimination inquiry but never citing, in the majority opinion, to Pike,
balancing, or per se invalid standards).
198. See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390 ("As we find that the ordinance
discriminates against interstate commerce, we need not resort to the Pike test."); Oregon
Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 100 ("Because the Oregon surcharge is discriminatory, the
virtually per se rule of invalidity provides the proper legal standard here, not the Pike
balancing test."); Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 455 n.12 (1992)(refusing to apply Pike's relaxed
scrutiny to a discriminatory statute that is "not a close case."l; Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342
n.5 (1992) (rejecting the State's attempt to avail itself of the more flexible "balancing"
standard, holding that the "lesser scrutiny is only available where ... there is no patent
discrimination against interstate trade."); New Energy Co. oflnd. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273 n.2 (1988) (refusing to analyze Ohio statute under Pike "in light of the
disposition of the discrimination claim."). But see Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enter., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988) (noting that the Ohio statute at issue "might have been
held to be a discrimination that invalidates without extended inquiry," but choosing
instead to proceed straight to the balancing test).
199. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (collecting cases where Court failed
to give sufficient weight to plain evidence of protectionist purpose).
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tion have blurred together. 200 When the Court does express concern
with protectionist motive, it commonly does so by resorting to a
discrimination analysis. 201 Frequently, the prohibition against economic protectionism would either disappear entirely from dormant clause
opinions202 or be given scant, perfunctory mention as a "general
principle" or rationale underlying the more important, overriding
discrimination inquiry.203
The Supreme Court's evolution from general balancing to discrimination review has left the lower courts currently uncertain of the crucial
concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause. Some circuit courts, for
example, proceed straight to balancing the burdens and benefits of all
local or state regulations without analyzing, or indeed even mentioning,
either discrimination or protectionism.204 Following the clear dictates
of the Supreme Court in Pike and its progeny, most lower courts believe
they must apply the balancing test to all "evenhanded" regulations--in
other words, to regulations that do not discriminate against interstate

200. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981)
("Minnesota's statute does not effect 'simple protectionism,' but 'regulates evenhandedly
.... '"); cf New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278 (defining a protectionist enactment as
discrimination in the "constitutionally prohibited sense."); Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid
Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce Clause, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 529, 551
(1994) (concluding that for courts invalidating flow control ordinances, "flow control is
clearly discriminatory because it seeks or serves to protect local investment in waste
facilities by insulating them from out-of-state competition."); Tushnet, supra note 9, at
130 (demonstrating that the Court's definitions of economic protectionism and
discrimination against interstate commerce are often identical).
201. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 198 (addressing argument that
Massachusetts milk pricing order is "not protectionist, because the costs of the program
are borne only by Massachusetts dealers and consumers, and the benefits are distributed
exclusively to Massachusetts farmers.").
202. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (without
even mentioning economic protectionism, the Court notes that "[t]he principal objects
of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate
commerce.").
203. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390 (identifying discrimination as the
central concern of the dormant Commerce Clause and describing the prohibition against
economic protectionism as a rationale for the "rule against discrimination").
204. See Pioneer Military Lending, Inc. v. Manning, 2 F.3d 280, 284 (8th Cir. 1993)
(analyzing state regulation under the "balancing" test without evaluating or even
mentioning discrimination or economic protectionism, notwithstanding fact that state's
pro-offered justification for the statute was protectionist); Medigen of Kentucky, Inc. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 985 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1993) (analyzing state regulation under the
"balancing" test without mentioning discrimination or e.conomic protectionism). Cf Blue
Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994) (finds
Pike balancing test applicable and remands to lower court to conduct full balancing after
engaging in only a cursory discrimination analysis).
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commerce.205
Some courts however, seem reluctant to balance,
expressing hesitancy to act as "superlegislatures" or second guess the
empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation.206 Finally, many courts have cautiously chosen to engage in the
difficult and arguably legislative task of balancing despite the fact that
they have found the challenged regulation discriminatory and invalid
under the per se standard.207 Rarely will a lower court recognize
protectionism as the overriding concern prohibited by the dormant
Commerce Clause. 208

205. See, e.g., Scariano v. Justices of the Supreme Court oflnd., 38 F.3d 920,926
(7th Cir. 1994) (Court proceeds to apply the Pike balancing test after analyzing a state
statute for discrimination and finding that "no discrimination can be said to exist.");
Johnson, MacDonald & Assocs. v. Webster Plastics, 856 F. Supp. 1249, 1254 (S.D. Ohio
1994) (noting that if Ohio statute at issue did not discriminate, it would nevertheless be
judged under Pike's balancing approach); Sherwin-Williams Corp. v. San Francisco, 857
F. Supp 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that the "greater weight of legal authority'
dictates analyzing nondiscriminatory regulations under Pike's balancing test.").
206. See Pacific Northwest Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("how much risk to wildlife is acceptable ... is quintessentially a legislative
determination"); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 983-84 (9th
Cir. 1991) (rejecting "close balancing" as inappropriate and holding that the district court
erroneously made a quasi-legislative judgment about whether the effect on interstate
commerce was greater than the beneficial effects on the local environment); New York
State Trawlers Assn. v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1308 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976))("the judiciary may not sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom ... of legislative policy determinations.").
207. See Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 900 F.2d 686, 690-91 (3d Cir. 1990) (court
holds facially discriminatory statute invalid under per se standard but goes on to balance
anyway to demonstrate that the discriminatory finding was not outcome determinative);
Government Suppliers Consolidating Serv., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1279 (7th Cir.
1992) (same). The Third Circuit appears to have adopted its own unique approach in
analyzing dormant Commerce Clause cases. It typically begins its dormant Commerce
Clause analysis by selecting one of three separate standards of review: ( 1) a heightened
review standard, which will likely be fatal to the local legislation; (2) a deferential
review standard, which will likely uphold the local legislation; or (3) the Pike balancing
standard. See Old Bridge Chem., Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 965
F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1992); Juzwin, 900 F.2d at 690-91. But see Instructional Sys.,
Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 824 (3d Cir. 1994) (adopting the twotiered approach to dormant Commerce Clause analysis set forth in Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
208. See, e.g., Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1992) (analyzing a facially neutral trailer fee statute for discriminatory effect only,
without mentioning economic protectionism or inquiring into the purpose of the
regulation); J. Filiberto Sanitation v. Dep 't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 919 n.5
(3d Cir. 1988) (noting that it is "emphasizing the discrimination element of dormant
Commerce Clause analysis" but taking no position on the question of whether
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Thus, a quarter of a century after Pike, the Court's dormant Commerce
Clause standard can be summarized as depicted on Graph B. The Court
will focus on the now critically important discrimination inquiry,
applying a per se rule of invalidity to any regulation that can be said to
discriminate against interstate commerce. The prohibition against
economic protectionism is relegated to the background in the Court's
analysis, recited in a perfunctory statement of general principle or
evaluated merely to lend weight to the primary discrimination analysis.
The prohibition against economic protectionism has not taken shape as
an independent, primary concern in the contemporary Court's review of
local legislation.

Graph B

The Current Discrimination Model
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SECTION THREE

This Section begins by suggesting why the dormant Commerce Clause
ought to focus primarily on prohibiting economic protectionism, as a
concept distinct from discrimination, especially when a per se rule of
invalidity is applied to local legislation meeting this threshold. It

discrimination is the dormant Commerce Clause evil or a measure of the evil); WLR
Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Vir. 1994) (analyzing a
facially neutral hostile takeover statute for discriminatory effect only, without mentioning
economic protectionism or inquiring into the purpose of the legislation). See also supra
note 194 (courts defining dormant Commerce Clause review as the "two-tiered"
discrimination focused analysis). But see Chambers Medical Technologies of S.C., Inc.
v. Bryant, 52 F.3d 1252, 1260 n.l (4th Cir. 1995); Waste System Corp. v. County of
Martin, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993) (separately analyzing discrimination and economic
protectionism).
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concludes by proposing a new model of dormant Commerce Clause
review, which I call the ''protectionist-first" model. As suggested by its
name, this model requires a court to evaluate a local regulation first for
protectionism, applying the strict per se invalid standard to protectionist
measures only. The model suggests that the discrimination analysis is
useful as a test for protectionism in some cases and as a standard to
apply to nonprotectionist measures. Finally, the protectionist-first model
imposes limits to judicial review power under the dormant Commerce
Clause by providing that nonprotectionist measures that do not discriminate against interstate commerce are beyond a court's authority to
review.
A.
1.

Why Target Protectionism?

Examining the Theoretical Underpinnings of the Dormant
Commerce Clause

A dormant Commerce Clause review model will obviously be shaped
by the primary theoretical focus it advances. A debate currently exists
among scholars regarding the merits of the two most frequently defended
underlying justifications for the dormant Commerce Clause: that the
dormant Commerce Clause ought to protect a "federal free trade market"
and that it ought to protect a state's local democratic process.209 The
debate over dormant Commerce Clause policy originates with the general
question of whether courts interpreting the Constitution should protect
substantive values or democratic processes.210 Pure process theorists

209. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 130-31 (describing a political process theory of
dormant Commerce Clause review); Eu.le, supra note 2, at 428-35 (embracing a process
theory and arguing that protecting a federal free trade market is not a legitimate
rationale); Regan, supra note 20, at 1113-14 (describing purpose of the Commerce
Clause as preventing economic protectionism). See also Korobkin, supra note 30, at 748
(describing the free trade market and political process rationales as "competing
justifications" for the dormant Commerce Clause). As previously noted, a separate
debate exists concerning whether the dormant Commerce Clause ought to exist at all to
guard against state isolation or balkanization. See, e.g., Redish & Nugent, supra note
21 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause is unsupported by text in the
Constitution, conflicts with the Constitution's balance of federalism, and is unnecessary
because the Privileges and Immunities clause serves the same goal as the dormant
Commerce Clause).
·
210. See Korobkin, supra note 30, at 748 (citing JOHN HART ELY in DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST for popularizing the democratic political process theory and Laurence H.
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advance a dormant Commerce Clause review model that is concerned
solely with prohibiting interstate discrimination as the most effective way
to ensure representation of both supporters and opponents of local
legislation and to protect local democratic processes. 211
Exclusive reliance on a process-based analysis to evaluate local
legislation is problematic because it is not always a consistent or reliable
indicator of either protectionist or discriminatory local legislation. It is
difficult to determine practically how much local opposition strength is
necessary to ensure fair representation. Every local enactment is likely
to have its local opponents, as well as its local supporters. Strong
interest groups opposing local efforts can frequently be identified, even
in cases where the absence of a local political check seems clear. 212
Many dormant Commerce Clause cases, however, are brought through
the judicial system by resident businesses who are burdened by their
state's legislation.213 In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality, for example, the Court evaluated Oregon's
facially discriminatory legislation that subjected waste generated outside
the state to a disposal surcharge nearly three times greater than the
surcharge imposed for the disposal of in-state waste. Two of the three
petitioners bringing the court challenge against this ordinance were
powerful in-state residents. 214 A pure process theorist might conclude
that this facially discriminatory ordinance confronted sufficient in-state

Tribe in The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE
L.J. 1063 (1980) and CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 9-10 (1985) for arguing that the
Constitution has a substantive commitment to certain values and policies).
211. Democratic process theorists generally reject the notion that the dormant
Commerce Clause should protect a product, a national market, or be at all concerned
about the economic balkanization of the states. See Eule, supra note 2, at 428-35
(arguing that protecting a federal free trade market is not a legitimate rationale for the
dormant Commerce Clause). But see Tushnet, supra note 9 (supporting a political
process theory with the rationale that the dormant Commerce Clause embodies free trade
policies).
·
212. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1994) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (noting that the majority recognized at least two strong interest groups
opposed to Massachusetts' milk order--consumers and milk dealers). See also Maltz,
supra note 18, at 55 (recognizing that "evaluating the likely influence of [any local
group] on the State legislature is necessarily an imprecise process.").
213. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (challenger
oflocal ordinance operates an in-town recycling center); Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 338 (1992) (challenger operates "one of the Nation's oldest
commercial hazardous waste land disposal facilities" located in-state); Fort Gratiot
Landfill v. Michigan Dep't Of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (challenger is an
in-state private landfill operator).
214. One petitioner was an in-state solid waste landfill operator that accepted waste
generated both in Oregon and outside the state. The other in-state petitioner was an
Oregon county operator. The third petitioner was an out-of-state landfill operator.
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 97 (1994).
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political opposition, thus raising no problem with the dormant Commerce
Clause under a political process model. Yet, the Oregon ordinance
expressly identified out-of-state commerce and treated it differently from
in-state commerce, based solely on the fact that the article of commerce
was generated out-of-state. 215 Oregon used the channels of interstate
commerce intentionally to protect its residents and isolate itself from a
national market. Oregon's ordinance was both protectionist and facially
discriminatory; however, reliance on a pure representational or process
analysis may have allowed such an ordinance to stand.216
The Court's acceptance of a political process theory in dormant
Commerce Clause review has been sporadic, at best.217 Perhaps the

215. The Court noted that the respondents did not claim that waste generated
outside the state imposed a higher cost or was more dangerous to health and safety than
waste generated in the state. Rather, respondents attempted to justify the discrepancy
by arguing that (1) the higher surcharge was a compensatory tax, necessary to make
shippers pay their fair share of disposal costs, and (2) the higher surcharge was necessary
to spread the costs of in-state disposal fairly. The Court rejected these arguments and
concluded that respondents could offer no legitimate reason why out-of-state waste was
subjected to a discriminatory surcharge. Id. at 108.
216. In the end, perhaps the "free trade" and "political process" rationales of the
dormant Commerce Clause should not be so singularly advanced. These underlying
rationales are not easily pigeon-holed to the specific anti-protectionism and antidiscrimination principles. For example, when the political theory approach, focusing
primarily on discrimination as the primary evil, first received recognition in dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it was supported on the principle that the dormant
Commerce Clause was intended to protect our Nation as a "federal free trade unit" and
advance free trade policies. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 130-31 (quoting Justice
Jackson in H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) ("Our system,
fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be
encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in
the Nation....")). But see Eule, supra note 2, at 428-35 (criticizing the protectionist
view for addressing only free trade or national market concerns and concluding that the
dormant Commerce Clause should be construed to "preserve processes rather than to
protect products."). Although an exclusive pure political process model has its practical
difficulties, testing the local political process for fair representation may be a useful
check for protectionism or discrimination.
217. See Korobkin, supra note 30, at 749-51 (setting forth the handful of Supreme
Court decisions that have "sporadically hint[ed]" at a political process rationale for the
dormant Commerce Clause). In the eight major dormant Commerce Clause opinions
issued since 1992, the political process rationale played a role in only one majority
opinion. See supra note 4. In that case, West Lynn Creamery, the Court relied in part
on a process based rationale to conclude that Massachusetts' milk pricing order violated
the dormant Commerce Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, concluded in dissent
that evaluating local interest group participation in the political process should not be a
part of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 215
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that "nothing in the dormant Commerce Clause
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fairest criticism leveled against an exclusive democratic process model
is that it completely ignores the only dormant Commerce Clause value
that possesses the "strongest historical foundation and the most
reasonable grounding in American political theory: the avoidance of
Balkanization among the states resulting from trade policies that tend to
disrupt the union."218 Prohibiting protectionist trade policies is widely
thought to give effect to the rationale that the dormant Commerce Clause
was meant to create, protect, and ensure an "area of free trade among the
several states."219 In fact, the court has noted that the entirety of
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence "grew out of the notion that
the Constitution implicitly established a national free market."220
Unlike an exclusive political process test for discrimination, a dormant
Commerce Clause review test that is concerned primarily with preventing protectionist trade policies that threaten national unity rests on solid
historical ground. 221 Although other constitutional provisions addressed some of the specific concerns of that time, 222 at its heart, the
Commerce Clause was designed to help the states form "a cohesive
suggests that the fate of state regulation should turn upon the particular lawful manner
in which the state subsidy is enacted or promulgated" and that "[a]nalysis of interest
group participation in the political process may serve many useful purposes, but serving
as a basis for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause is not one of them."). Only
two terms earlier, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on a political process theory to conclude
in dissent that Michigan's ordinance prohibiting counties from accepting out-of-county
waste did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 370
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
218. Redish & Nugent, supra note 21, at 615-16.
219. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1984). See
Regan, supra note 20 (purpose of the Commerce Clause is to prevent local economic
protectionism).
220. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[v]irtually every one of our cases ... begins its analysis with some form
of the incantation that 'the very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area
of free trade among the several States .... "'). Id. at 470. (quoting Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 466 U.S. at 402-03).
221. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,325 (1979) (the court noted that
"the few simple words of the Commerce Clause . . . reflected a central concern of the
Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies
toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.").
222. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (restricting the power of the states to tax imports
and exports and foreign shipping); U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting imposition of a tax
or duty on articles exported from any state). See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."). The language of both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the
Commerce Clause were taken from the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation,
underscoring that the purpose of each clause was to secure and perpetuate mutual
friendship among the States and eliminate interstate discrimination. See Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518,533 n.16 (1978).
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whole" after the revolution. 223 The Framers contemplated national
unity.224 Protectionist practices are repugnant simply because they are
directly inconsistent with the quest for national unity. 225 As Professor
Regan noted, protectionism is the "economic equivalent of war."226 It
"takes over a market share by force."227 Protectionism ought to be
targeted as the evil prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause because
it is "hostile in its essence," and likely to cause resentment and invite
outsider retaliation. 228 A dormant Commerce Clause model that targets
protectionism directly gives effect to the Framers' intention of preventing
States from isolating themselves and destroying all hope of national
unity.229

2.

.

·

Narrowing the "Per Se Invalid" Power of the Dormant
Commerce Clause

The discrimination definition sweeps far too broadly to warrant
scrutiny under the strict, virtually per se invalid standard. As previously
discussed, a "discriminatory" state statute would theoretically include

223. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807 (1976). Chief Justice
Stone has noted that ''judicial application of the Commerce Clause 'perhaps more than
any other contributing element [has bound] the several states into a nation."'
Frankfurter, supra note 21, at 129. See also Smith, supra note 26, at 1207-08.
224. See Collins, supra note 20, at 52-55 (discussing constitutional history
underlying the dormant Commerce Clause and noting that "[i]nterstate rivalry was the
Convention's greatest concern.").
225. See Regan, supra note 20, at 1113 (describing a "concept-of-union" objection
to protectionism).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1114.
228. Id. at 1113-14 (describing a ''resentment/retaliation" objection to protectionism).
229. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 20, at 1113-14 (purpose of the Commerce Clause
is to prevent states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism, a notion that
is inconsistent with the concept of a political union); Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the
Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395,
433 (1989) ("[T]he core goal of the Commerce Clause was and is to engender national
solidarity."). Even commentators calling for abolishing the dormant Commerce Clause
recognize that its primary policy value is promoting a national free trade market and
prohibiting state protectionism or balkanization. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 21,
at 616 (avoiding state Balkanization caused by disruptive trade policies was "clearly the
greatest problem under the Articles of Confederation, and played an important role in
the establishment of the congressional commerce power in article I."); Amy M.
Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause, On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1215, 1215 (1994).
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any statute that benefits, even slightly, economic players within a state
to the detriment of their out-of-state competitors. It is irrelevant to the
question of discrimination whether the statute was designed to effect a
legitimate, non-protectionist purpose, and it is irrelevant if the degree of
discrimination is minimal. 230 A dormant Commerce Clause review
model that applies the virtually per se invalid standard more selectively
to protectionist legislation allows the judiciary to honor the historical
significance of the dormant Commerce Clause while maintaining the key
attributes of state sovereignty.
Because the dormant Commerce Clause defines elected and representative power vis-a-vis judicial power, the preferred dormant Commerce
Clause test might be shaped by one's view on the proper degree of
judicial activism in matters of constitutional structure, such as federalism
and separation of powers. 231 Yet, the very nature of the dormant
Commerce Clause makes it unique in the political structure debate
because Congress enjoys full constitutional authority to step in any time
it decides it is necessary to remedy a judicial pronouncement involving
interstate commerce. The fact that Congress is free to act if it concludes
that a court has improperly responded to local legislation should be
considered when deciding on the proper dormant Commerce Clause
review test. 232
Because the State will never have the last word, it makes little sense
to render it virtually powerless to legislate without fear of judicial upset
in the face of a broad per se invalid dormant Commerce Clause restraint.
After all, the dormant Commerce Clause acts as a silent constraint on the
central acts of a sovereign--legislating and regulating. 233 A narrower,
more focused per se constraint allows a State to conduct its business and
exercise its representational judgment. Instead of ensuring that local
representative branches are of limited power, a narrower dormant

230. See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
231. See e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE
( 1995) (arguing that matters of constitutional structure, such as federalism and separation
of powers, must not be removed from the judiciary to be resolved solely by political
branches and the States).
232. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (fact that Congress can always in effect overturn judicial invalidation of a
state law should inform standards used in Commerce Clause and dormant Commerce
Clause review); see also Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1,
IO (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that the extent of judicial scrutiny under the dormant
Commerce Clause reflects the ability of Congress to "undo any mischief worked by the
courts.").
233. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 2521 (1996); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982) ("[T]he
power to make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature.").

628

Targeting State Protectionism

[VOL. 34: 571, 1997]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Commerce Clause constraint grants a certain degree of deference to the
legislative results of a State's judgment. Moreover, it encourages a
certain degree of experimentation in the States, fostering resolution of
local problems in new and creative ways. 234
B.

The Protectionist-First Model of Dormant Commerce Clause
Review

The "protectionist-first" model of dormant Commerce Clause review,
as depicted on Graph C, attempts to provide some framework to a
court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis while respecting the seminal
principles that have evolved in the Court's contemporary dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. This model of dormant Commerce
Clause review explicitly recognizes economic protectionism as the
primary evil prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause. It looks first
for protectionism and submits only protectionist legislation to the strict
per se standard of invalidity.235 Under the protectionist-first model,
protectionism is no longer a concept wrapped up with discrimination,
and it is not necessary that a statute be found to discriminate before it
Graph C
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234. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 652-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that courts
should not handicap certain degree of experimentation in the states).
235. See Regan, supra note 20, at 1134. Per se invalidity standards have value under
certain circumstances. The existence of a judicially enforced per se invalid rule may,
for example, have a preventative effect, halting local legislatures from passing
protectionist legislation.
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can be declared a protectionist measure. Moreover, the protectionist-first
model ensures that when clear evidence of legislative protectionist
purpose exists in the record, it will be evaluated and given appropriate
weight by the reviewing court.
If a statute is not a protectionist measure, the protectionist-first model
next evaluates the effect of the statute and asks whether it discriminates
against interstate commerce. Thus, this model respects the Court's longheld concern with the representative and process concerns often
evaluated in a discrimination analysis, while it subordinates concerns
with discriminatory legislation to an overriding concern with protectionism. In doing so, the protectionist-first model realigns the primary
objectives of the dormant Commerce Clause. The protectionist-first
model recognizes the reality that not all protectionist measures are easy
to identify. A discrimination analysis will often identify those instances
where a legislature has effectively hidden its protectionist purpose in the
face of a pretextual justification for a statute.
While current dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggests that
the Pike balancing test be applied to all local regulations, even those that
are neither protectionist nor discriminatory,236 the protectionist-first
model applies the balancing test only to non-protectionist measures that
actually discriminate against interstate commerce. By retaining the Pike
balancing test, the protectionist-first model recognizes that balancing is
sometimes useful because it is flexible enough to enable a reviewing
court to respond appropriately to the myriad of circumstances that may
come before it in a dormant Commerce Clause review. 237 However,
the balancing test has been fairly criticized as one that requires a court
to engage in quasi-legislative functions. 238 Moreover, although the
balancing test is a flexible one, it is not a test that provides sufficient
guidance to lower courts analyzing subsequent cases and local legislatures attempting to understand the reach of the dormant Commerce
Clause before drafting legislation.239 Thus, the balancing test is best

236. See supra notes 194, 198, 205 and accompanying text.
237. See R. Randall Kelso, Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to
Constitutional Review of Legislation: Standards, Ends, and Burdens Reconsidered, 33
S. TEX. L.J. 493, 516-17 (1992) (in any constitutionality review, "there is inevitably
pressure for whatever doctrine the Court adopts to be sufficiently flexible that the Court
can be responsive to the individual circumstances presented in each case.").
238. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Regan, supra note 20, at 1106-08.
239. See, e.g., Trailer Marine Transp. Corp. v. Riveria Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 10 (1st
Cir. 1992) ("Formulas for applying the dormant Commerce Clause are, if flexible enough
to be valid, usually too general to resolve concrete cases."). See also Kelso, supra note
237, at 517 (noting that a tension always exists in constitutionality review between the
need to maintain flexibility and the need to provide guidance to lower courts).
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used pursuant to some definable standard or criteria, rather than applied,
as it is now, to any local statute that comes before a court in a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge.
Finally, the protectionist-first model advances the view that dormant
Commerce Clause review should have its limits. If a local statute is
neither protectionist nor discriminatory, it should not be subject to a
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Constitutionality review is not
designed to be an all-inclusive analysis of every statute's efficiency,
efficacy, and overall sensibility. The Court has consistently recognized
that a local law can be "both economic folly and constitutional."240
Indeed, as one commentator recently noted, the Court will sometimes
deliberately state that a local measure withstands constitutional analysis
"whatever one may think of the wisdom of the measure (the mild
approach) or no matter how foolish the measure may be (the caustic
approach)."241 Judicial restraint in constitutional analysis is a principle
common to numerous areas of the law. 242 Other branches of government have the authority and the expertise to pronounce policy on the
merits of legislation. 243 This should be especially true in dormant
Commerce Clause analysis when a nonprotectionist statute does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, but may unwisely burden
national commerce. Congress is the body with the ability and the policy
expertise to make that determination.

240. CTS, 481 U.S. at 96-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
241. Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Constitution Outside The Courts, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1287, 1300 (1993). Mr. Schwarz remarked that in Noble State Bank
v. Haskell, Justice Holmes noted that a "very powerful argument D can be made against
the wisdom of the legislation, but on that point we have nothing to say, as it is not our
concern." 219 U.S. 575, 580 (1911). In addition, Mr. Schwarz cites to Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958), wherein Justice
Frankfurter notes that it is "not the business of the Court to pronounce policy."
Schwarz, supra, at 1300.
242. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 68 (1992) (noting that states may constitutionally
opt for a variety of economic theories in making corporate law without reason to think
that the Supreme Court will write any one theory into constitutional law); Note, An
Economic Analysis of The Plaintiff's Windfall From Punitive Damage Litigation, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992) (arguing that certain punitive damage awards are economic
folly but still constitutional).
243. Cf William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975) (Congress has the power to expand
rights).
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Although the Supreme Court and the majority of lower courts apply
Pikes flexible balancing test to all local legislation, a minority of circuit
courts have adopted the position advanced in this Article that the only
burdens suitable for analysis under the balancing test are burdens that
actually "discriminate" against interstate commerce.244 The Third
Circuit appears to be the only circuit consistently to advance this
position.245 In applying the Pike balancing test, the Third Circuit will
:first define the "incidental burdens" that the statute imposes on interstate
commerce, and it will then determine whether, on balance, those burdens
are "clearly excessive" in relation to the statute's "putative local
bene:fits."246 Under Third Circuit precedent, the only "incidental
burdens" that implicate the dormant Commerce Clause are burdens that
discriminate against interstate commerce.247
In support of its position, the Third Circuit reasons that the purpose
of the dormant Commerce Clause is to prohibit protectionism and seek
uniformity. 248 The Third Circuit has noted that "where the burden on

244. See, e.g., Instructional Sys. v. Computer Cu1Ticulum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 826
(3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995) (collecting Third Circuit cases). See
also New York State Trawlers Assoc. v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1308 (2d Cir. 1994)
(defining the "incidental burdens on interstate commerce" that are weighed under Pike's
balancing test as "the burdens on interstate commerce that exceed the burdens on
intrastate commerce" but further concluding that the burdens in that case fell into the
"incidental" category because "the discrimination in question does not favor in-state
economic interests against out-of-state interests."); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 507 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989)
(concluding that in the absence of discrimination, an argument that a state law affects
interstate commerce "too much" is meritless) Cf Pacific Northwest Venison Producers
v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 918 (1994) (noting that
legitimate regulations that neither disrupt travel or shipping due to a lack of uniformity
in state laws, impact commerce beyond the state's borders, nor impose burdens more
heavily on out-of-state interests are arguably not subject to invalidation under the
Commerce Clause) (dicta).
245. See Instructional Sys., 35 F.3d 813 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176
(1994); Old Bridge Chems. v. New Jersey Dep't Envtl. Protection, 965 F.2d 1287 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992); J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988); Norfolk Southern Corp. v.
Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987).
246. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (defining Pike's balancing test as
weighing "incidental" burdens on interstate commerce against "putative local benefits").
247. See Instructional Sys., 35 F.3d at 826 (collecting cases); See, e.g., Norfolk, 822
F.2d at 406 (concluding that it was unnecessary to review the district court's finding of
a material dispute with respect to "putative benefits" because the record revealed "no
legally relevant burden on interstate commerce that could be found to be 'excessive."').
Cf Filiberto, 857 F.2d at 922 (finding no discriminatory incidental burden, the court
notes that it need not engage in balancing test, but it nonetheless proceeds to note the
regulation's substantial local benefits).
248. See id.; cf Pie-A-State PA, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 42 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1994)
("The purpose of the Commerce Clause is to protect the national interest in facilitating
commerce between the states and with foreign nations.").
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out-of-state interests rises no higher than that placed on competing instate interests, it is a burden on commerce rather than a burden on
interstate commerce."249 Moreover, in the case that laid the groundwork for the Third Circuit's position, the court reasoned that the
Commerce Clause should not be read to provide greater protection to
out-of-state interests than it does to in-state interests. 250 The Noifolk
court conceded that other courts do interpret the Pike balancing test to
mean that any increased cost imposed on out-of-state interests should be
considered a relevant burden, even if the identical cost is imposed on instate interests. However, the Norfolk court concluded that Supreme
Court precedent and the purpose of the Commerce Clause dictate a much
narrower comparative burden concept.251 Thus, the Third Circuit has
consistently refused to apply the Pike balancing test to local legislation
unless the legislation imposed some discriminatory burden on interstate
commerce.
In closing, consider the application of the protectionist-first model to
the hypothetical statute banning all price advertising for fresh produce.
We have already seen the circumstances under which the statute will be
declared a protectionist measure and reviewed under the strict per se
invalid standard. Now assume that the purpose of the statute is unclear
or nonprotectionist and the effect of the statute is either uncertain or not
so substantial that it must render a legitimate purpose suspect. Under
these circumstances, a court might more confidently accept the
legislature's proffered justification, even though the statute does indeed
discriminate in its effect to favor local industry. The protectionist-first
model proposes that a court grant more deference to the state in its
dormant Commerce Clause review and evaluate such a statute under the
Pike balancing test. But, if the record contains no evidence of protectionism and shows that the legislating state has few "mom and pop"
stores, no failing local industry, and primarily large interstate stores that
are burdened by the legislation, the legislation, while perhaps burdensome on commerce, could not be said to "discriminate" against interstate
commerce. In that event, it should not be subject to any constitutionality
249. Norfolk, 822 F.2d at 406. See also Instructional Sys., 35 F.3d at 826-27.
250. Norfolk, 822 F.2d at 406.
251. Id. The Norfolk court noted that the incidental burden that the Court found
excessive in Pike was clearly discriminatory, and that in Clover Leaf Creamery, the
Court searched only for discriminatory burdens when deciding that Minnesota's ban on
the retail sale of plastic jugs survived the balancing test. Id.
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review under the dormant Commerce Clause. A court should consider
such a statute beyond the judicial reach of the dormant Commerce
Clause. If Congress decides that this state statute is too burdensome on
national commerce, it can take the appropriate action under its Commerce Clause authority to regulate interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION

Economic protectionism and discrimination against interstate
commerce are not synonyms. This Article urges a retreat from the
current trend that focuses a court's attention in dormant Commerce
Clause review on the discrimination inquiry. There is value in a
dormant Commerce Clause review model that expressly recognizes
resident protectionism as a concept unique from discrimination and as
the primary evil to be addressed by the dormant Commerce Clause.
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